LINGUISTIC REFERENCE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY AND ACTION: REVISITING THE T/V DISTINCTION

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The present study uses naturally occurring conversational data from various dialects of Spanish to examine the role of second-person (T/V) reference forms in the accomplishment of social action in interaction. I illustrate how the turn-by-turn progression of talk can occasion shifts in the linguistic means through which speakers refer to their hearers, an interactional commonality between dialects (and possibly languages) that are otherwise pronominally dissimilar. These shifts contribute to the action of an utterance by mobilizing the semantic meaning of a pronominal form in order to recalibrate who the interactants project they are, and who they project they are to one another—not in general, but rather at that particular moment in the ongoing interaction. The analysis posits a distinction between identity status and identity stance to argue in favor of a more microlevel conceptualization of identities and contexts as emergent features of moment-by-moment discourse, co-constructed through the deployment of grammatical structure.*

Keywords: social interaction, semantics, pragmatics, membership categorization, pronominals, methodology, Spanish

1. INTRODUCTION. Person reference has been a topic of inquiry in the analysis of interaction since its earliest conceptions. Like linguists, philologists, and grammarians before him,1 Harvey Sacks became interested in how conversationalists navigate the vast repertoire of resources at their disposal to refer to others in talk, proposing a novel method of investigating these uses in his Lectures on conversation (Sacks 1992). While some of this work—particularly on membership categorization devices (or MCDs)—has since, in Emanuel Schegloff’s (2007c:462) words, ‘faded from central attention’, recent crosslinguistic and cross-cultural research has once again highlighted the fundamental significance of person reference to our understanding of how linguistic structure is used to accomplish action in interaction (cf. e.g. Blythe 2013, Enfield & Stivers 2007).

The present analysis examines second-person singular (‘you’) person reference in Spanish, which, depending on the dialect in question, can include up to three pronominal options from which to choose: tú, vos, and/or usted.2 Sociolinguistic—and, in particular,

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Claudia Parodi, Distinguished Professor of Hispanic Linguistics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Claudia provided invaluable support and feedback on this project from its initial inception through submission of the manuscript to Language. It was a privilege to learn from and work with her for over a decade at UCLA. Que en paz descanse.

1 See, for example, the first comprehensive grammar of the Spanish language: Antonio de Nebrija’s Gramática de la lengua castellana, first published in 1492. While this volume was not as widely circulated as the author’s grammar of Latin, it nevertheless presented a detailed explanation of the early Spanish pronominal system.

2 Some dialects permit combinations of one of these overt pronouns with the verbal morphology typically associated with another, thereby generating more than three ‘types’ of recipient reference (see e.g. Páez Urdaneta 1981, Torrejón 1986). Nonetheless, the data analyzed here do not display any such combinations; thus I leave discussion of this phenomenon for future research.
traditional dialectological—approaches to forms of address in the Spanish-speaking world have focused primarily on document ing the inventory of differing speech communities: Which pronominal forms exist for a given group of speakers based on geographic origin, socioeconomic status, age, gender, and so on? This is plainly visible, for example, in the categorization of dialects as tuteante (users of tú) vs. voseante (users of vos) varieties (Fontanella de Weinberg 1999, Lipski 1994, Páez Urdaneta 1981). Indeed, Calderón Campos and Medina Morales (2010:199) go so far as to assert that ‘almost all research’ on pronominal variation in the Spanish-speaking world since the Second World War, due to the influence of Brown and Gilman’s (1960) seminal work ‘The pronouns of power and solidarity’, has subscribed to this methodological paradigm.

Reflecting the growing interest in the use of spontaneous conversation within linguistics more generally, a variety of authors in recent years have highlighted the need for a methodological shift toward naturally occurring discourse as the means through which to analyze forms of address in Spanish (e.g. Steffen 2010:443, Vázquez Laslop & Orozco 2010:264). Yet research has largely continued to focus on the composition of speakers’ pronominal inventories rather than on what interactants actually do with their inventory on a turn-by-turn basis as they engage in interaction with others. So the question remains: How are T/V options from interactants’ repertoires mobilized in moment-by-moment talk, in the service of social action? That is, how are recipient reference forms ‘put to work’, so to speak, to get things done through language (Austin 1962)?

In addressing these questions, the present study illustrates the ways in which conceptualizations of identity and context as static, predetermined, or altogether ‘given’ are inadequate when examining the emergent, action-based goals of real coparticipants in talk. As we will see, interactants do not simply arrive at a context or situation and instantly conjure up a preconceived, corresponding identity that endures until the interaction is complete. On the contrary, coparticipants themselves actively co-construct their immediate context, ‘talking it into being’ (Heritage 1984) on a turn-by-turn basis as they invoke their relevant, respective identities with one another. In this article, I argue that second-person reference forms, by way of their underlying semantics, are an especially productive tool for accomplishing this task, as each usage provides a new opportunity to grammatically recalibrate who the speaker and hearer are to one another, what context they are creating together, and what actions are being attempted within that context—not between the interactants ‘in general’, but rather at that precise moment in the discourse. Furthermore, I posit that the ability to mobilize recipient reference forms in this way may constitute a common interactional feature between dialects (and even languages) that are otherwise divergent in terms of their pronominal inventories.

In what follows, I first give some crosslinguistic background on the study of (person) reference in naturalistic talk-in-interaction. Next I focus on second-person reference in particular by briefly reviewing the pronominal forms available to speakers of Spanish, as well as the array of grammatical resources that inherently invoke these forms. After an introduction to a distinction between what I refer to as identity status and identity stance, the majority of the article is then dedicated to the detailed examination of various situationally diverse excerpts of Spanish data that illustrate how interactants can mobilize linguistic resources for recipient reference in order to negotiate their re-

4 For similar perspectives of context as dynamic, see Auer & di Luzio 1992, Duranti & Goodwin 1992, Gumperz 1982a,b, and Hymes 1964.
spective identities and thereby shape social actions on a turn-by-turn basis in talk. I conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of the analysis, as well as outlining potential avenues for future research.

2. LINGUISTIC REFERENCE IN INTERACTION. So multiple and complex are individuals’ identities that an immediate task for speakers arises in the need to single out some aspect(s) of those identities to be used in/as the reference. As Schegloff (1991:49–50) explains in describing membership categorization devices:

the fact that someone is male, or is middle aged, or is white, or is Jewish is, by itself, no warrant for so referring to them, for the warrant of ‘correctness’ would provide for use of any of the other reference forms as well. Some principle of relevance must underlie use of a reference form, and has to be adduced in order to provide for one rather than another of those ways of characterizing or categorizing some member.

Given the array of possible and equally ‘correct’ formulations available to refer to others, the fact that this speaker selects this option at this moment illustrates how the design of a reference form can, in Sacks’s (1992:597) words, be ‘relevant for the doing of some activity’ (cf. Fox 1987, Sacks & Schegloff 1979, Schegloff 1996). In the case of reference to third persons, for instance, Stivers (2007:94) describes what she calls alternative recognitions as follows:

Whereas unmarked reference forms (most commonly names in English) are neutral with respect to the action being deployed in the speaker’s turn, alternative recognitions are designed to be fitted specifically to the action in which they are embedded and therefore to work to convey the action or account for it.

Thus, when a son is conversing with his mother and elects to use the marked form your other son instead of the unmarked form (i.e. his brother’s name), more than just referring is taking place. An additional social action, such as complaining, is being partially conveyed through the design of the person reference (Stivers 2007:81–82).

In producing a reference to a person, speakers naturally make use of the resources provided to them by the structure of their specific language. Distinct social-interactional work has been shown to be accomplished in Korean, for instance, through the use of demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns that distinguish between proximal (i ‘this’) and distal (ce ‘that’) copresent third persons. Contrary to traditional grammars of the language, Oh (2007, 2010) illustrates that the choice of quasi-pronoun is not based purely on physical/spatial organization, but instead takes into account the ‘territories of knowledge’ (Heritage 2011, 2012a,b, Kamio 1997) being invoked though the ongoing talk. One example finds a mother conversing with her daughter and her daughter’s friend/schoolmate (Oh 2010:1227–29). When the mother mentions something to the friend about giving birth to her daughter, she uses the proximal quasi-pronoun to refer to her daughter given that she (the mother) has primary epistemic and experiential rights over this information (cf. Raymond & Heritage 2006). Moments later, though, she uses the distal pronoun to refer to her daughter in the context of school performance, given that the daughter’s schoolmate is more knowledgeable about her daughter in this arena than she (Mom) is. Thus, although the physical/spatial landscape between the interlocutors remained unaltered, the epistemic landscape shifted as a different configuration of social relationships became relevant in the talk, with a specific grammatical resource being deployed to both achieve and reflect this shift.

Analysis of naturally occurring conversational data has similarly complicated the ‘proximal’ vs. ‘distal’ distinction between demonstratives in Lao. Enfield (2003:115) illustrates how ‘Lao speakers’ choices between the two available demonstratives are influenced by conceived extensions of here-space … determined, in turn, on the basis of pragmatic factors EMERGENT IN THE DYNAMIC INTERACTIONAL SITUATION’ (my empha-
sis). ‘Given the omnipresence of an interactional maxim of recipient design’, Enfield argues, speakers use ‘their addressees’ presumed access to information relevant for inferring the extension of the speaker’s conceived here-space’, a fact that authors of reference grammars cannot treat in sufficient detail (Enfield 2003:115).

Research on the design of first- and second-person references, although comparatively sparse, offers parallels to these findings that link linguistic reference to emergent identities and recipient design. In their examination of first-person singular I vs. plural we, Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) argue that orientations to particular recipients, together with the communicative objectives of a turn at talk, play a crucial role in the selection of the reference form (cf. also Schegloff 2007a), with repairs from one pronoun to the other serving to resolve issues of epistemic authority and responsibility.5 Similarly, Hepburn, Wilkinson, and Shaw (2012) present examples of repaired self- and recipient reference designs in English—that is, the use of the pronoun I vs. a noun phrase, or the pronoun you vs. a noun phrase—and make the case that such repairs ‘are routinely not limited to fixing problems of understanding but are also used in the service of the interactional task at hand’ (Hepburn et al. 2012:175). Finally, from a contact-linguistic perspective, Raymond (2012b) demonstrates how speakers of Salvadoran origin living in the United States can navigate who is ‘Salvadoran-born’ and who is ‘non-Salvadoran-born’ through the deployment of the second-person pronouns tú and vos. The intricacy with which speakers deploy grammatical structures from their respective languages to refer to one another and to their surroundings therefore illustrates the substantial import placed on the invocation, management, and negotiation of coparticipants’ complex identities in real-time, moment-to-moment discourse, as well as how these identities can contribute to the achievement of action in interaction.

The analysis presented here expands our understanding of person reference and identity by unpacking the emergent, action-relevant deployment of second-person (T/V) formulations in Spanish. Before looking at the data, let us briefly review the grammatical resources and options that exist in (dialects of) the language.

3. The case of Spanish. Spanish is typically categorized, both popularly and academically, as a language possessing an explicit T/V distinction (Brown & Gilman 1960): tú/vosotros(as) (and their corresponding morphologies) being the nondeferential, socially intimate, or ‘informal’ references, and usted/ustedes (and their corresponding morphologies) being the deferential, socially distant, or ‘formal’ references. Such a distribution, seen in Table 1, describes the majority of speakers of (standard) Peninsular Spanish.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nondeferential</td>
<td>tú</td>
<td>vosotros(as)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td>ustedes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Example of a T/V pronominal system in Spanish (Standard Peninsular).

While the Peninsular Spanish dialect depicted above suffices to exemplify a pronominal system with a T/V distinction, the pan-Hispanophone distribution of pronouns is considerably more complex, as documented in the recent 1,193-page volume Formas y fórmulas de tratamiento en el mundo hispánico (Hummel et al. 2010). Indeed, we will

5 On repair more generally, see Schegloff et al. 1977.

6 Although note that even this distribution is oversimplified as there is variation between the plural forms vosotros and ustedes in Andalucia. See Calderón Campos & Medina Morales 2010 for an overview.
see some of this variation in the examples that follow as we focus on second-person singular references.

Regardless of the dialect in question, though, it is essential to recognize the relative richness of Spanish-language morphology when compared to a language like English. In addition to the subject pronoun references themselves (tú, vos, usted), various other grammatical elements correspond to and pair with those reference forms, even when the subjects themselves are not pronounced as in cases of pro-drop. A few of these features (verbo-morphological, object pronominal, and adjectival) are seen in Table 2.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Tense</th>
<th>Tú</th>
<th>Vos</th>
<th>Usted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(hablar ‘to speak’)</td>
<td>hablas</td>
<td>hablás</td>
<td>habla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preterit (Simple Past) Tense</td>
<td>(hablar ‘to speak’)</td>
<td>hablaste</td>
<td>hablaste(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperative Mood</td>
<td>(hablar ‘to speak’)</td>
<td>habla</td>
<td>hablá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Object Pronoun</td>
<td>(e.g. I hit you)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Object Pronoun</td>
<td>(e.g. I ask you)</td>
<td>te</td>
<td>te</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive Pronoun</td>
<td>(‘yourself’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessive Adjective</td>
<td>(‘your’)</td>
<td>tu</td>
<td>tu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Some grammatical elements invoking person reference in Spanish.

That is to say, at each and every grammatical position in which reference to some second person may appear—no matter the part of speech—the second person must obligatorily be categorized as tú, vos, or usted. Moreover, hearers undoubtedly recognize how they are being referred to by way of this multiplicity of resources, even without the explicit use of a subject pronoun. As a brief example of this, take excerpt 1 below, in which two Los Angeles-based friends—one of Costa Rican origin and the other of Mexican origin—are comparing college degree requirements.

(1) Costa Rican and Mexican Spanish in contact8

01 CR: Pero qué clases estaba tomando though:. Like-

‘But what classes were (youusted) ta:king though:. Like-’

02 Yo le entiendo que sus clases [son-

I youusted understand.1sg that yourusted classes are

‘I understand from youusted that yourusted classes are’

→ 03 MEX: [Usted?]

04 CR: Oka:y.

05 Qué clase has estado tomando.

what class have:tu been taking

‘What cla:ss have (youre) been taking.’

7 Voseo morphology varies dialectally. See Benavides 2003 and Páez Urdaneta 1981 for detailed overviews.

8 Transcripts follow the conventions of Jefferson 2004 and Hepburn & Bolden 2013, which are summarized in the appendix. Additionally, words are glossed with TÚ, VOS, or USTED to make explicit which second-person singular form is being used. For the purposes of the present study, I do not discriminate analytically between references designed with overt pronouns vs. those realized only morphologically, since both forms are fully intelligible by hearers (as seen in e.g. excerpt 1). Nonetheless, in the English translations, single parentheses are used around person reference forms that were realized solely through verbal morphology—in an effort both to remain as faithful as possible to the original data in cases of pro-drop, and to facilitate future investigation of the overt vs. nonovert pronoun distinction in naturally occurring Spanish talk-in-interaction (see Raymond 2015:57–58 for discussion).
Some varieties of Costa Rican Spanish use *usted* with all interlocutors regardless of deferential status (similar to English *you*), while others pattern more closely with other Central American dialects in maintaining a distinction between *vos* and *usted* as non-deferential and deferential forms of address, respectively (Lipski 1994:224, Moser 2010:273, Quesada Pacheco 1996). This Costa Rican speaker’s use of *usted* as her baseline reference form in this exchange may thus reflect a dialectal norm of universal *usted*; alternatively, she may be using *usted* as her default in this dialect-contact situation specifically to avoid the use of *vos*, a form that is socially stigmatized in several Spanish-speaking communities in the United States (Parodi 2003, 2004, 2009, 2011, Raymond 2012a). Regardless of this particular speaker’s motivation for using *usted*, however, the fact remains that her Mexican interlocutor, whose dialect does indeed maintain a semantic/pragmatic distinction between *tú* and *usted*, finds such a reference oddly deferent as a default form between social equals, and he specifically orients to and problematizes the reference form in line 3. In this particular case, his Costa Rican interlocutor quickly acquiesces in lines 4–5, and the interaction progresses onward with the use of *tú*. Note, though, that the *ustedeo* (or ‘*usted*-ness’) of the Costa Rican’s initial talk in lines 1 and 2 is conveyed only through verbal morphology *estaba* (cf. *tú*: *estabas*), an indirect object pronoun *le* (cf. *tú*: *te*), and a possessive adjective *sus* (cf. *tú*: *sus*)—not through the explicit use of the pronoun *usted*. Similarly, her acquiescence to *tú* in line 5 is also realized morphologically: *has* (cf. *usted*: *ha*). Thus conversationalists are plainly seen to be (i) orienting to the uses and social/interpersonal significance of these pronominal options at the ground level of interaction, and (ii) doing so even without overt (subject) pronouns.

4. Status and stance. Even when taking into consideration the vast amount of dialectal variation that exists among different speech communities, research on Spanish (and other languages’) person reference systems most frequently assigns one pronoun to one (type of) interlocutor, very often as the product of questionnaire/interview methodologies (e.g. Braun 1988, Brown & Gilman 1960, Jaramillo 1996, Murillo 2003, Orozco 2006, Sanromán Vilas 2010, Schreffler 1994, Schwenter 1993, Solé 1970, Vargas 1974, among many others). Such sociolinguistic inquiries regularly report, for instance, that ‘Dialect X uses *tú* with friends and family, and *usted* with strangers or in certain situated contexts’, or ‘In Dialect Y, *usted* is used with grandparents, but all other members of the family receive *vos*’. But are friends and family in Dialect X really always *tú*—in each and every turn at talk? And are strangers really always *usted*? Or are these reference forms, and their corresponding linguistic structures, better conceptualized as resources that can shift (sometimes repeatedly) over the course of an interaction; if so, how?

When pronominal shifts are mentioned in the literature, researchers typically mention them only anecdotally, as an aside, in just a few short sentences (sometimes even in a footnote). As a case in point, Quesada Pacheco (1996:107–8) asserts that, in some Costa Rican dialects, ‘it is the conversational situation and the mood that decide one or another pronoun, meaning that one can go from *usted* to *vos* even in the same conversation’. But this is the entirety of the author’s discussion of pronoun switching; we are left to imagine how this actually occurs. Similarly, other scholars mention the spontaneous uses of the *usted de distancia, de enojo, de cariño*, and *de confianza* (*usted* of distance, anger, affection/intimacy, and trust, respectively) (e.g. Hummel et al. 2010:16);

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9 See Callejas 1983 for a similarly brief claim made about Cuban Spanish.
but again these analyses do not offer any description of how second-person reference form switches are systematically co-constructed by speakers and hearers in sequences of actual language use. That is, what triggers them in the unfolding, turn-by-turn interaction, and what do they serve to accomplish for the participants?

The present analysis proposes to address these questions about the deployment of reference forms in interaction by incorporating a distinction between status and stance into our conceptualizations of identity and social relationships. Using this terminology to examine knowledge-based rights and responsibilities in conversation, Heritage (2012a:32) writes that epistemic status is a relative positioning ‘in which persons recognize one another to be more or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowledge as a more or less settled matter of fact’. In a doctor-patient consultation, for instance, the doctor is more knowledgeable about the interpretation of medical test results, diagnoses, and so on, compared to the medically untrained patient, and both interactants typically recognize this asymmetry in their epistemic statuses vis-à-vis medical knowledge as ‘given’. If status is conceived of as a more enduring feature of social relationships, stance, by contrast, ‘concerns the moment-by-moment expression of these relationships, as managed through the designs of turns-at-talk’ (Heritage 2013:377). Thus stance refers to the ways in which the aforementioned doctor and patient formulate their talk such that the medical expertise of the doctor becomes oriented to and is thereby made interactionally relevant in the actual turn-by-turn use of language.


Here I posit that the distinction between stance and status can be similarly employed to generate a more nuanced understanding of identity more generally. I use identity status as a gloss for the multiple, largely ‘more or less settled’ aspects of individuals’ identities—for example, that a given individual is a mother, a lawyer, forty-five years of age, upper-middle class, and so on. I use identity stance to refer to the moment-by-moment invocation of one or more of these identities in and through the co-constructed talk: that is, the ways in which participants—through the design of their utterances—‘activate’ or mobilize the interactional relevance of some or another aspect of one’s identity at a given moment in the discourse. Unpacking identities in this way will allow us to examine what Labov (1972:304) has called the ‘unstated assumptions about social relations’ (cf. Searle 1976:5) that exist between these negotiated identities (cf. Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2014). Applying this framework to the T/V system of Spanish, I argue that previous investigations have focused primarily on the relative ‘more or less settled’ statuses of the interactants, their identities, and their social relationship, without attending to the moment-by-moment stances interactants take toward one another over the course of an interaction, and how reference forms specifically can be implicated in the enactment of these stances.

Similar to the strategy used by Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) and Oh (2010), described above, here I target shifts from one reference form to another (e.g. usted to tú, vos to usted, etc.). In these cases, while the respective identity statuses of the interactants remain unaltered, I argue that the identity stances invoked between them have changed based on the progression of the talk, and that the linguistic distinction between reference forms allows this shift to be made explicit and relevant through the grammar.
of the turn. Moreover, I illustrate the ways in which such in-the-moment switches in
stance—from a form whose underlying semantics conveys social distance to one invok-
ing social intimacy, or vice versa—can actively be ‘put to work’ in sequences of inter-
action to recalibrate relevant speaker and hearer identities in the service of social action.

5. DATA AND ANALYSIS. In an effort to demonstrate that the phenomenon presently
under analysis is not bound to any particular situated context, we will discuss examples
from both institutional talk (e.g. calls to 911, political interviews; Drew & Heritage
1992) and everyday, ordinary conversation (e.g. casual chats at home among family
members, phone calls between friends). Similarly, several dialects of Spanish are repre-
sented in the data that follow to underscore that the moment-to-moment negotiation
of identity through person reference is not a feature unique to any single region of the
Spanish-speaking world. Rather, as the examples below illustrate, switches in person
reference formulation are mobilized in a range of situations and by persons who can be
characterized in terms of a range of dialects, genders, ages, relative social statuses, and
relationships.

5.1. Institutional talk. Compared to the unconstrained nature of ordinary talk,
participants’ communicative objectives in institutional contexts are more easily identi-
fied in connection with their institution-relevant identities (Heritage & Clayman 2010,
Heritage & Drew 1992). For instance, in a call for emergency service (i.e. ‘call to 911’),
the caller’s overall goal is naturally to attain whatever service s/he is requesting (e.g.
ambulance, squad car, etc.), and his/her turn-by-turn use of language demonstrates an
active orientation to that goal (Zimmerman 1992a,b, 1998). Let us therefore take ad-
vantage of the ‘special and particular constraints’ (Heritage & Drew 1992:22) of insti-
tutional talk as a first step in our analysis of second-person pronoun deployment.

Excerpt 2 below comes from a 911 call placed in the southwestern United States, in
which the caller describes a man who has threatened his life.10 As described below, this
particular problem presentation is launched, in line 52, from an entitled position more
normally used in calls for customer service (Tracy 1997; cf. Curl & Drew 2008).

(2) Call to 911: ‘Mirá’
50 911: Buenos días. (.) Cuál es su emergencia?
       good days what is your.usted emergency
       ‘Good morning. (. ) What is your usted emergency?’
51 → 52 CLR: Buen mirá: e- Yo te e- Yo: te digo:. (.)
good look.imp.vos um I you vos um I you vos tell.1sg
       ‘Okay look: you vos um- I’ll tell you vos.’
53 (. ) Yo vengo de Nueva York.
       I come.1sg of N Y
       ‘(.) I’ve come from New York.’
54 (1.0) Y:: (0.5) Vengo hace poco que:
       and come.1sg makes.3sg little that
       ‘(1.0) A::nd (0.5) I came only a short time ago’

10 The phonology and morphosyntax of the caller and call-taker, as well as explicit questioning later in the
call, reveal them to be Argentine and Mexican(-American), respectively. This is mentioned to underscore that
the phenomena under examination here are not dialect-specific.
resulta que:

and results.3sg that

and it turns out that:

hay un hombre que me amenazó de muerte,

there is a man that threatened.3sg of death

there is a man that threatened my life,

((CLR continues problem presentation))

The call-taker opens this stretch of talk by characterizing the caller as usted in line 50 through the possessive adjective su ‘your’ (cf. tú/ vos: tu). Using the deferential person reference form in an institutional interaction of this sort attempts to invoke a context of what is called ustedeo mutuo, or ‘mutual usted’. The caller, however, does not reciprocate, instead using the nondeferential vos imperative mirá ‘look’ (line 52) (cf. usted: mira). The sequential juxtaposition of this nondeferential form immediately after the call-taker’s deferential design launches the caller’s problem presentation in a way that encodes an asymmetric social relationship with the call-taker. Furthermore, this specific turn preface marks an overt disjunction from and redirection of the call-taker’s question (Sidnell 2007) as the caller begins his own extended telling: Yo te e- Yo: te digo: (‘I’ll you vos um L’ill te:ll you vos.’; line 52), again using the nondeferential form via the indirect object pronoun te (cf. usted: le). Thus, from the very onset of his initial turn, this caller has placed himself in what Tracy (1997) refers to as a ‘customer service’ frame as opposed to ‘public service’ frame—highly entitled to receiving the service he is requesting. This continues through to the conclusion of the problem presentation with the nondeferential Me enténdes? ‘Do (youvos) understand me?’ (line 69) (cf. usted: me entiende).

Nonetheless, one might argue that this social asymmetry is analyst-imposed: Where is the orientation of the interlocutors themselves that vos is nondeferential and thereby invokes one set of respective identities, while usted is deferential and invokes another?

To address this question, we consider a later stage in the call.

Following the excerpt shown above is the interrogative series (Zimmerman 1984) in which the call-taker asks for clarification on a few points (i.e. where this man is currently, what prompted the initial altercation with the caller, etc.). Finally, in excerpt 3 below, a response to the request for service is given.

(3) Call to 911: ‘Mire’

Mm-Bueno señor desafortunadamente,=para que yo pueda enviar mm-good sir unfortunately for that I can.1sg send.inf

‘Mm-Well sir unfortunately,=for me to be able to send’

a la policía: necesito una dirección hh adónde pueda prt the police need.1sg an address to.where can.1sg

‘the police I need an address hh where I can’

enviarla. (0.5) También necesitaría el nombre de esta persona send.inf:it also need.cond.1sg the name of this person ‘send them. (0.5) I would also need the person’s name’
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124 y la fecha de nacimiento (0.5) eh [para poder: and the date of birth eh for be.able.INF
‘and his date of birth (0.5) eh to be a:ble’

125 CLR: [( ) exactly e-exactly
‘( ) exactly eh’

→ 126 Mire: ( . ) en este papel (0.5) yo lo saqué del internet look.imp.usted on this paper I it took.1sg of.the.internet
‘Loo:k(usted) ( . ) on this paper (0.5) I got it off the internet’

127 (1.0) porque: yo: quise investigar que era en because I wanted.1sg investigate.INF that was.3sg in
‘(1.0) beca:use I: wanted to investigate that it was’

128 verdad que me decían que este tipo había sido buscado truth that they were telling me that this guy had been wanted
‘true that they were telling me that this guy had been wanted’

129 ( . ) e: buscado por la policía, < muy bien? look. for by the police very well
‘( . ) uh: wanted by the police, < okay?’

130 (0.5) Yo lo busqué: y: sí. I him looked.for.1sg and yes
‘(0.5) I loo:ked for him a:nd yes.’

131 (0.3) Tengo toda la información, have.1sg all the information
‘(0.3) I have all the information,’

132 (0.5) fecha de nacimiento: apellido: nombre tengo todo y en date of birth last.name name have.1sg all and in
‘(0.5) date of bi:rh la:st name first name I have it all and in’

133 qué año empezó él ha: cometer (0.5) estos crímenes what year started.3sg he to commit.INF these crimes
‘what year he started .hh to commit (0.5) these crimes’

134 (1.3) Me entiende?

→ 135 Me understand.usted
‘Do (you)understand me?’

In lines 126 and 135, we see that the caller has shifted from addressing the call-taker with voseo morphology to now using usted morphology. In fact, these are precisely the same verbs in identical discursive positions as observed above in excerpt 2, providing us with two ‘minimal pairs’ of sorts: a turn-prefatory imperative in the case of ‘look’: Mirá: (line 52 of excerpt 2), which is now Mire: (line 126 of excerpt 3), and pursuing uptake after the completion of a telling in the case of ‘Do (you) understand me?’: Me entendés (line 69 of excerpt 2), which is now Me entiende? (line 135 of excerpt 3).11 Although the respective identity statuses of these interactants remains unaltered—

11 These switches also demonstrate that even seemingly routine pragmatic expressions—often referred to as ‘discourse markers’—can nonetheless remain morphologically complex enough to convey the semantic/pragmatic content of person reference forms, and therefore are able to change their morphological composition over the course of the talk (see also excerpt 11 below).
indeed, they continue to be 911-caller and 911-call-taker, service-solicitor and service-provider, man and woman, and so forth—I posit that the identity-relevant stances they have taken over the course of the interaction have shifted, and that the mobilization of grammatical resources for person reference is accomplice to this shift.

Despite the fact that an overt rejection of the request for emergency service is not uttered by the call-taker (e.g. ‘No’), the caller nonetheless orients to the call-taker’s list of requirements (lines 121–24) as a movement toward a rejection, which would also occasion overall call closure. Although the call-taker was, in reality, always (from the very onset of the interaction) the gatekeeper to service (i.e. gatekeeper identity status), with this move toward rejecting the request for service, she invokes that identity in a way that is now unambiguously consequential for the caller and his interactional objective (i.e. gatekeeper identity stance). In response, then, the caller begins to actively defer authority to the call-taker, announcing that he already possesses exactly ‘exactly’ (line 125) the information she is telling him he needs to acquire in order for service to be granted. In effect, through these responsive utterances, the caller adopts a new, more cooperative stance. Furthermore, he assures the call-taker that he did not go looking for this information because, for example, he is a paranoid, trouble-seeking individual: he explains in lines 127–29 that he had heard rumors about this man, and that is why he looked up the information.

Switching person reference forms is an essential aspect of this recalibration of identities that was conditioned by the call-taker’s interactional move toward the rejection of service. The caller’s switch from nondeferential vos to deferential usted mobilizes the deferential semantics of the new reference form in tandem with the content of his turns, demonstrating an active orientation to the gatekeeper identity now being interactionally enacted by the call-taker. In addition, this shift in reference forms reveals the caller’s orientation to the stance he himself was previously claiming at the onset of the interaction (as one who was unambiguously entitled to service from a ‘customer service representative’) and to the stance he is taking now (as one who must demonstrate to a gatekeeper a legitimate need for service). By mobilizing the usted form’s semantics of deference to show respect for the call-taker’s authority, the caller’s novel, more ‘suppliant’ stance naturally serves his overall objective of attaining institutional service. This modified landscape of identity stances was thus not predetermined at the onset of the call, but rather was co-constructed by the participants as they each invoked the relevance of distinct identities over the progression of the interaction, with a shift in reference form both reflecting as well as contributing to this new identity configuration.

Turning to a different dialectal region and institutional context, the following set of examples are taken from a Peruvian political interview show called Prensa Libre, hosted by a prominent lawyer and journalist named Rosa María Palacios (PAL). In excerpt 4, Palacios interviews Martha Chávez (CHA), a candidate running for Congress to represent Lima for the 2011–2016 term. The topic of discussion here is Chávez’s views on human rights and violations thereof, something for which she has been widely criticized. The reference form between interviewer and interviewee has been mutual usted for the entirety of the interview (as seen, for example, in line 14). In lines 35–36, however, there is an instance of self-repair by Chávez to suddenly—and only momentarily—treat Palacios as tī.

(4) Prensa Libre: Palacios interviews Chávez
14 CHA: Sabe usted Rosa María.=
know.usted you.usted R M
‘You usted know Rosa Maria.=’
La vez pasada yo aquí creo que lo mencioné. The time past I here think.1SG that it mentioned.1SG
‘=The last time I was here I believe I mentioned it.’

PAL: [Mm,]
CHA: [.hhh La convención americana >de< derechos humanos, the convention American of rights human
‘.hhh The American Convention >on< Human Rights,’

en el cuarto articulo, in the fourth article
‘in the fourth article,’
cuando habla de la pena de muerte [dice, when talks.3SG of the penalty of death says.3SG
‘when it talks about the death penalty says,’

PAL: [°°M,°°
CHA: ((pointing)) Que incluso los condenados a pena de muerte= that included the condemned to penalty of death
‘That even those sentenced to the death penalty=’

=tienen derecho siempre a amnistía o indulto. have.3PL right always to amnesty or pardon
‘=have the right always to amnesty or pardon.’

PAL: [Sí por supuesto. yes for supposed
‘Yes of course.’

CHA: ((noding)) Y entonces. and then
‘And so.’

Si las personas que [(sean) culpables] if the persons that are.3PL guilty
‘If the people who (are) guilty’

PAL: [Salvo que sea ] genocidio. unless that is.3SG genocide
‘Unless it’s genocide.’

CHA: ↑↑No no: No no: N[o-Ni se menciona el genocidio allí. no no no no no self mention.3SG the genocide there
‘↑↑No no: No no: No-Genocide is not even mentioned there.’

PAL: [((voice crack))
CHA: ↑↑No no: No no: N[o-Ni se menciona el genocidio allí. no no no no no self mention.3SG the genocide there
‘↑↑No no: No no: No-Genocide is not even mentioned there.’

tipificación que se da a partir del año= typification that self gives.3SG to leave-INF of the year
‘classification that is applicable starting in the year=’

dos mil tres para nosotros,= two thousand three for us
‘=two thousand three for us,’
Prior to this extract, Chávez has been expressing her dissatisfaction with how amnesty laws are currently being applied in Peru, her claim being that ‘terrorists’ are receiving the benefit of amnesty while members of the armed forces, for example, are left in jail. Chávez reinforces her perspective on this issue at the beginning of this excerpt through line 24, not only vocally by explicitly citing a specific article of a legal document (lines 18–24), but also gesturally by pointing (lines 15–16, 18–19, 23).

Nonetheless, beginning in line 28, Palacios challenges Chávez’s interpretation of the document in question by citing an exception to the law, namely that those convicted of genocide and sentenced to death (like those to whom Chávez has been referring) are not eligible for pardon or amnesty in the way that others are. Chávez’s high-pitched multiple saying ↑↑No no: No no: (line 29) conveys that Palacios has persisted unnecessarily in this line of challenging and ‘should properly halt [her] course of action’ (Stivers 2004:260). In addition, the ni ‘not even’ and the repetition of the noun phrase following the multiple saying assert Chávez’s own knowledge from second position (Stivers 2005; cf. Heritage & Raymond 2005) that, contrary to Palacios’s assertion in line 28, ‘genocide’ is not specifically mentioned in the document being debated (line 29). Palacios continues to challenge the candidate’s understanding of the law in overlap in line 31 but ultimately yields the floor to Chávez, who claims that the legal category of ‘genocide’ did not come into effect until 2003, and that Peruvian law does not permit retroactive application of contemporary legislation to violations from years prior—something that Rosa María Palacios is presented as knowing perfectamente ‘perfectly’ (line 35). In invoking this shared legal knowledge, Chávez first addresses Palacios as usted, just as she has done for the first ten minutes of the interview, but immediately repairs this reference to tú (lines 35–36). As mentioned earlier with reference to Lerner and Kitzinger’s (2007) analysis of shifts in first-person reference forms, such instances of self-repair are particularly note-
worthy because either reference design would technically be ‘correctly’ interpretable; that is, there is no need to repair the original *usted* reference in order to better understand who the referent is (as is often the case with third-person reference formulations). Here, the reference is to Palacios either way. Nonetheless, THROUGH THE REPLACEMENT OF *USTED* WITH *TÚ*, Chávez treats the initial *usted* reference form as inapt for her turn in progress, accompanied also by deletion of the adverb *perfectamente* ‘perfectly’.

The turn in question—Chávez’s lines 35–36—constitutes a preface that frames the forthcoming legal information as shared knowledge between interviewer and interviewee, both of whom are lawyers. Palacios has just taken a stance in which she implicitly claims that Chávez’s misunderstanding of amnesty laws is due to her (Chávez’s) insufficient knowledge of the relevant legal documents (lines 28, 31). Chávez’s overt switch from *usted* to *tú* in response works to counter Palacios’s claim of epistemic authority by actively invoking shared common ground (Clark 1996) with her interlocutor—embodying, THROUGH THE REFERENCE FORM, co-membership in the now-relevant ‘lawyer’ category and thus equal access to the laws under debate, as an account for her forthcoming contrastive legal argument. Of course, these interactants were each lawyers and each possessed legal expertise prior to this moment in the interaction (i.e. lawyer identity status), but it is Palacios’s challenge, based in access to legal knowledge, and Chávez’s response to that challenge that together invoke the here-and-now relevance of this specific shared-in-common identity (i.e. lawyer identity stance). This moment of ‘alikeness’ through the use of the nondeferential reference form simultaneously attempts to shed some of the institutional context of the talk and establish a more affiliative local context by cleansing the potential defensiveness of the initial use of *usted*, as well as that of the upcoming turn as a whole (cf. Jefferson 1974). Moreover, because the coparticipants’ identities are now presented as aligned or shared after a sequence riddled with confrontation and disalignment, the legal claim Chávez is about to put forth to Palacios and the at-home viewers (lines 38–41/43) is launched from a base in sincerity (Clayman 2010), objectivity, and therefore indisputability—which is the primary objective of the preface as a whole. Indeed, Palacios does not challenge this perspective, but rather paraphrases the final answer and the interview moves on to a new topic.

Excerpt 4 illustrated a shift in the news interview context—from *usted* to *tú*—for the purposes of indexing a shifted identity framework. But the sequential progression of talk in this same context can occasions shifts in the opposite direction as well—from *tú* to *usted*.

Another *Prensa Libre* interview is shown in excerpts 5 through 8.12 The interviewee in this case is Gonzalo Alegría (ALE), also a candidate for Congress in Peru. While Palacios employs *usted* throughout her questioning (just as in the previous interview with Martha Chávez),13 Alegría treats Palacios as *tú*.

(5) *Prensa Libre*: Palacios interviews Alegría: ‘Un ejemplo’

10 ALE: *Te* doy un ejemplo.

11 Actualmente. Por decirte. Eh?

12 See Raymond 2016 for additional analysis of this particular interview.

13 The fact that Palacios uses solely *usted* in these examples also provides evidence against some form of (dis)accommodation (Giles et al. 1991) as the (primary) driving force(s) behind these switches.
This unmarked distribution of reference forms (Palacios to Alegria: usted; Alegria to Palacios: tú) is not demonstrably oriented to by the participants themselves at each and every turn. Nonetheless, as the interview progresses, stances and action objectives change—and so do Alegria’s reference formulations for Palacios.

Just as in the interview with Martha Chávez, in excerpt 6 below, the interviewee is forced to respond to a challenge by Palacios about his understanding of and position regarding a legal issue. Contrary to the strategy employed by Chávez, however, when Palacios displays his epistemic primacy over the laws involved in what Alegria is proposing (lines 70/72–76), Alegria’s bueno-pues-prefaced (Raymond 2017a), twice-hedged, and noticeably mitigated response shifts to usted, invoking the form’s semantics of deference to effectively yield authority on this matter to Palacios (lines 77–78).

(6) Prensa Libre: Palacios interviews Alegria: ‘Arbitrios municipales’

68 ALE: Hay una cosa que se llaman

‘There is something called’

69 los arbitrios municipales,

‘the judgments municipal’

70 PAL: Sí,

‘Yes,’

71 ALE: Que se aplican a los bienes inmuebles.

‘That self apply.3PL to the goods property’

→ 72 PAL: [No;]

→ 73 (0.2)

→ 74 PAL: Los arbitrios se aplican para pagar servicios públicos.

‘The judgments are applied to pay for public services.’

→ 75 Y solamente pueden ser cobrados=

‘And they can only be charged=’

→ 76 =por el servicio que se pres[te efectivamente.

‘=for services that are given effectively.’

→ 77 ALE: [Bueno pues tal vez

‘Okay then perhaps’

→ 78 ALE: Tal vez lo que debo decirle entonces

‘that time it that should.1SG tell.INF:YOU,USTED then’

79 es que hay un impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles,

‘is that there is a tax on the goods property’

14 There may be gender-based divergences at work here that can explain this unmarked distribution. Nonetheless, our interest here is in the shifting from unmarked to marked forms. See Enfield 2007 for discussion of unmarked forms.
Just as we saw in the previous case, here, in producing her objection, Palacios makes interactionally relevant her identity as a legal expert by taking an epistemically superior stance (lines 70/72–76). Alegria’s pronominal shift to usted in response to this challenge (line 78), then, mobilizes the deferential semantics of the pronoun to actively acknowledge and concede to his recipient’s just-asserted superior expertise in tax law. Given the contrasting legal claims having been put forth by the interlocutors, this move from tú to usted simultaneously serves to temper the potential oppositionality of the turn in progress, in the same way that the move from usted to tú did in the previous exchange with Martha Chávez. Thus while the underlying semantics of usted and tú can indeed carry with them the notions of social distance and intimacy, respectively, in a given dialect (Brown & Gilman 1960, Brown & Levinson 1987), the ground-level pragmatic significance of invoking such distance or intimacy is no more automatic or predetermined than the identities of the interactants themselves. Rather, the interactional relevance of these pronominal options is conditioned by way of the moment-by-moment negotiation of identities in and through the ongoing talk.

The fact that recalibrating the speaker-hearer relationship is an emergent process is further demonstrated in this same interview, given that Alegria’s pronominal switch is not a permanent one, as seen in excerpt 7 below. Despite Palacios’s attempt to bring the discussion of taxes to a close (lines 101/103) and launch a new topic via the shift-implicative Ahora ‘now’ (line 105), Alegria insists on describing his campaign plan that was previously derailed by Palacios’s legal questioning in excerpt 6 above. In shifting back to his own territory of knowledge (i.e. his running platform), over which he has epistemic primacy, Alegria simultaneously shifts back to tú as he reaffirms his ‘promise’ (line 106) for economic change in Lima.

(7) Prensa Libre: Palacios interviews Alegria: ‘Te concreto’

101 PAL: Esa es la situación.
   ‘That is.3SG the situation’

102 ALE: Mmhmm.

103 PAL: Y eso >lo sabe usted muy bien.<
   ‘And that >you know.usted very well’

104 ALE: [Bue- go(od)
   ‘Wel-’

105 PAL: Ahóra.
   ‘Now.’

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15 Indeed, here we have another ‘minimal pair’ of sorts (as we saw in excerpts 2–3) with ‘to tell you’: decirte (tú) from line 11 in excerpt 5 becomes decirle (usted) in line 78 of excerpt 6.
Alegría continues to employ tú for several turns as the topic of discussion moves to transportation reform. At this point, he references his master plan for a new Central Station in Lima, a topic that unambiguously lies in his epistemic domain. Nonetheless, as we have already seen Palacios do several times, she again interrupts his proposal to announce that the project he is describing was already begun in 2006 by Mayor Luis Castañeda Lossio.

(8) Prensa Libre: Palacios interviews Alegría: ‘Perdóneme’

150 PAL: Eso se llama la Estación Central de Castañeda: . hhh
that self calls. 3sg the station central of C
‘That’s called Castañeda’s Central Station. ’hhh’

151 (0.5)

152 ALE: E-Bueno pues. Perdóneme: que:
good well pardon.imp.usted:me that
‘E-Okay well. Pardon(usted) me that’

153 (.) que le diga:
that you.usted tell.1sg
‘(.) that I tell you.usted’

154 Yo no sé si Castañeda tiene ese proyec to o no, I no know.1sg if C has.3sg that project or no
‘I don’t know if Castañeda has that project or not, ’

. . ((PAL describes what Castañeda’s project was/is))

. .

165 PAL: La Estación Central está fren[te al] Palacio de la Justicia.
the station central is front to the palace of the justice
‘The Central Station is in front of the Justice Hall.’

166 ALE: [Ah bueno.
good
‘Ah okay.’

Here, upon receiving yet another objection from Palacios, the 0.5-second delay, the bueno-pues preface, and the hitches and self-repairs in lines 151–54 index Alegría’s orientation to the dispreferred nature of his turn in progress (Pomerantz 1984, Raymond 2015, 2017a, Sacks 1987 [1973]). In conjunction with these features of turn design, he mobilizes a person reference design that will align with and reinforce the face-saving action being attempted in his utterance (Brown & Levinson 1987). Thus, yet again, Alegría’s morphological switch from tú to usted (Perdóneme ‘Pardon me (usted)’ and le ‘you (usted)’, lines 152–53; cf. tú: perdóneme and te) embodies a shift in the stance he is taking vis-à-vis a territory of knowledge and therefore in the stance he is taking toward his interlocutor—from one of epistemic authority in the prior excerpt 7, to one of epistemic deference here in excerpt 8—a shift that was occasioned by the co-constructed progression of the talk.

The institutional interactions analyzed in this section problematize the view that second-person pronoun selection is altogether predetermined or otherwise fixed based on immutable interactant identities and/or the context or situation (Firth 1957, Halliday 1973, Malinowski 1923) in which they find themselves. As I have demonstrated, a so-
called ‘formal’ context such as a political interview, for example, does not portend the a priori use of a ‘given’ set of identities or reference forms from beginning to end. On the contrary, through the stances they take over the progression of talk, coparticipants can make interactionally relevant different facets of their identity, and recipient reference forms are one linguistic means through which these identities are invoked, managed, and negotiated in and through the ongoing interaction.

5.2. EveryDay talk. Ordinary conversation, Heritage (2005:109) observes, ‘encompasses a vast array of rules and practices, which are deployed in pursuit of every imaginable kind of social goal, and which embody an indefinite array of inferential frameworks’. Given that institutional talk, described in the previous section, typically involves a reduction and specification of this range of discursive practices (Heritage & Drew 1992), it comes as no surprise that the emergent negotiation of identity through linguistic reference forms occurs in mundane, everyday conversation as well. Thus, just as in a call to 911 or a political interview, a casual conversation between a mother and daughter can occasion the (temporary) recalibration of the speaker-hearer relationship at a particular moment based on the stances being enacted by the interlocutors. Moreover, because coparticipants in ordinary conversation are not orienting to specific goals tied to institution-relevant identities, the range of identities enacted in everyday interaction is considerably more diverse.

Straddling the divide between institutional and ordinary interaction is talk between radio hosts and those who call in to make song requests, as seen in the call below placed to a Latino radio station in Los Angeles (Raymond 2017b). While the participants eventually do orient to the institutional nature of the call (i.e. making a request for a song to be played), this institutionality is not demonstrably relevant to the interactants at all points (Schegloff 1992). Indeed, the opening and initial sequences of such calls pattern more closely with those of ordinary telephone calls (Schegloff 1968) than with institutional calls (Wakin & Zimmerman 1999, Zimmerman 1984).

In excerpt 9, observe how the host moves from tú, the default/unmarked norm of Los Angeles Vernacular Spanish (LAVS) (Parodi 2003, 2004, 2011, Raymond 2012b), to usted as the interaction progresses and the caller’s (Yvonne) origin and overall identity become more ambiguous.

(9) Morning Call to Latino 96.3
01 HOS: Cómo te llamas mamita.
      how _yourself.tu_ call.tu_ mom.dim
      ‘What’s _your_ name beautiful.’
02 CLR: Yvonne!
      Y
      ‘Yvonne!’
03 HOS: Cómo estás mi reina?
      how _are.tu_ my queen
      ‘How _are (you tu) doing my queen?’
04 Apenas te estás levantando verdad?
      just _yourself.tu_ are.tu_ rising true
      ‘(You tu) are just now getting up right?’
05 CLR: NQ: Ya estoy manejando desde las seis de la mañana.
      [eh’toj] ['defide] ['sej]
      no already am.1sg driving since the six of the morning
      ‘NQ: I’ve been driving since six this morning.’
06 HOS: Y **usted** de dónde es Yvonne. and **you** **usted** from where are **usted** Y
‘And you **usted** where are you from Yvonne.’

07 Que yo le escucho un acentito. that I **usted** hear. 1sg an accent. dim
‘Cuz I’m hearing a little accent from you **usted**.’

08 CLR: De Panamá!
from P
‘From Panama!’

09 HOS: Panamá? Qué rico!
how rich
‘Panama? How awe:so:me!’

10 CLR: Sí!
yes
‘Yeah!’

11 HOS: Qué canción te puedo poner mamita?
what song can **tú** put. inf mom. dim
‘What song can I play for you beautiful?’

The host’s default reference form **tú** continues through the opening and into the launch of a how-are-you sequence, during which she asks if the caller is just waking up (lines 1/3–4). In her first multi-unit turn, the caller responds that she has actually been awake and driving for a few hours: **NO**: *Ya estoy manejando desde las seis de la mañana* ‘NO: I’ve been driving since six this morning’ (line 5). Orienting to the caller’s debuccalized/elided coda-position /s/ consonants in *estoy* [ehˈtoj], *desde* [ˈdeʃde], and *seis* [ˈsej] (cf. [esˈtoj], [ˈdeʃde], and [ˈseʃs], respectively), which is not a feature of the local dialect (Parodi 2003, 2004, 2009, 2011, Raymond 2012a), the host does not take up the caller’s news about driving, but rather initiates an and-prefaced post-expansion to uncover a ‘missing’ element of the caller’s preceding talk (Bolden 2010), namely where she is from (line 6). The host accounts for this inquiry in her immediately subsequent turn by explaining that she detects un acentito ‘a little accent’ from the caller.

The host’s questioning of the caller’s identity is accompanied by a switch from the default **tú** to the marked **usted**, the syntactic fronting of the pronoun (**usted** de dónde es, cf. de dónde es **usted**), and use of a proper name Yvonne (cf. *mi reina* ‘my queen’, line 3), serving to further underscore this new identity framework. The mobilization of the topicalized (and thereby emphatic; Bolinger 1972a, Miller 1996) **usted** form in this turn actively invokes a stance that a sense of social unfamiliarity or distance has newly emerged between the interactants: after hearing line 5, the host is no longer confident in the caller’s status as a comember of the Los Angeles speech community, and the switch in reference form pairs with the action of the question itself to grammatically enact this social distance and lack of access to the caller’s identity. Once this identity-based distance is resolved and an affiliative relationship is recreated among the interactants in lines 8–10, interpersonal familiarity is restored by a shift back to the familiar **tú** person reference, coupled with a return to the diminutive term of endearment mamita ‘beautiful’, as the host begins to invoke the institutional objective of the call (line 11).

Although it might be tempting, from our discussion thus far, to conceive of the negotiation of identity stances as relevant only when interactants are relatively unknown to one another, this is certainly not the case. Family members and close friends can mobilize linguistic reference formulations in the same way as do individuals whose relationships with one another are less established.
Take the extended excerpt 10, for example, between a Guatemalan mother and her daughter. Prior to this segment of talk, the interactants have been discussing the daughter’s boyfriend, whom Mom portrays as quite the freeloader. The daughter then vaguely alludes to having recently (yet again) lent him some money. We enter the exchange as Mom is attempting to unpack this bit of news that her daughter has just hinted at, explicitly verifying Que le distes dinero? ‘(You vos) gave him money?’ (line 3). After receiving confirmation that her daughter did indeed lend her boyfriend sixty dollars (lines 4–14), Mom undertakes a multi-turn assessment of this event before transitioning into a reciprocal storytelling, or ‘second story’ (Sacks 1992), in which she describes having been similarly taken advantage of by a family friend. Observe the sequential shifting of Mom’s treatment of her daughter from their unmarked vos, to marked usted, and then back to vos, as she takes different stances and invokes different identities across the progression of this stretch of talk.

(10) Mother and Daughter

01 DAU: De ¿qué?:?°
of what
‘About ¿what?:?’
02 (1.0)
03 MOM: Quele distes dinero?
that him gave vos money
‘(You vos) gave him money?’
04 DAU: ((sigh, eyebrow raise, looks up at ceiling))
05 Me pidió sesenta dólares de prestado,
me requested.3sg sixty dollars of loan
‘He asked me for sixty dollars as a loan,’
06 [((looks down, fiddles with hands))
07 (0.7)
08 Y:- [>se lo ↑pres][↑té
and to him it gave.1sg
‘And-I gave it to him’
09 [ ((gaze at ceiling)][((eye contact with Mom))
10 (1.7)
11 [No quería y nos: peleamos: (.) pero
no wanted.1sg and one another fought.1pt (. ) but
‘I didn’t want to and we: fought: (. ) but’
12 [((looks down, fiddles with hands))
13 (1.5)
14 [de último se lo pará:- (.) paré de dando. ((mini nod))
of last to him it stop- (. ) stopped.1sg giving
‘in the end I end- (. ) I ended up giving it to him.’
15 [(eye contact)]
16 (2.5) ((eye contact maintained))
17 MOM: <Increíble> ((eye contact maintained))
incredible
‘<Increíble>’
18 (1.0) ((eye contact maintained))
19 <Increible hija mia°> ((eye contact maintained))
incredible daughter mine
‘<Increible daughter of mine°>’
20 (1.0)
21 Pero no sé cómo es que usted deja que...
22 ‘But I don’t know how it is that you let...
23 ‘((looks down))
24 ‘=le afecte semejante cosa=
25 ‘=this sort of thing affect you.
26 ‘=si usted ya <sabe.>
27 ‘if you already know.
28 ‘=if you already <know.>
29 Ya <sabe.>
30 ‘(You) already know.
31 °Ya sé.° ‘I know.
32 °Ya sé.° Sí (.) Igual yo llamé:- Fausto:
33 already know.1sg yes same I called.1sg F
34 ‘°I know.° Yes (.) Same I called Fausto:
35 Hablé con él por teléfono. Lo llamé:,
36 talked.1sg with him for telephone him called.1sg
37 ‘I talked with him on the phone. I called him,’
38 (.) Y le dejé mensaje.
39 and to.him left.1sg message
40 ‘(.) And I left him a message.’
41 Y es que con tu papá,
42 and is.3sg that with your vos dad
43 ‘and it’s that with your vos dad,’
44 (.) el otro me:s, ...
45 the other month
46 ‘(. ) next month’

The familiar pronominal norm of vos between these two interactants is demonstrated morphologically in Mom’s initial request for confirmation in line 3. Following this, through lines 4–14, the daughter details how she ‘ended up’ (line 14) lending her boyfriend the money he was requesting. Throughout this second-position telling, there
are several signs of hesitation, including pauses (lines 7, 10, 13) and variations in gaze alignment and embodied action (lines 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16). The recounted event is thus noticeably offered up as reprehensible in that, through its design, the daughter is already preorienting to the sanctioning stance she expects Mom to take upon its conclusion. Indeed, Mom’s fixed gaze and facial expression paired with silence during the telling (lines 9–10, 12–13, 15–16) already begins a negative assessment of these events by structurally aligning with the action of storytelling (i.e. by suspending the normal rules of turn-taking; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974) but refusing to provide any overt affiliation (Goodwin 1984, Sacks 1974, Stivers 2008).

The pair maintain eye contact for nearly three seconds (lines 15–16) before Mom comes in with a low-volume, stretched ‘Incredible.’ ‘Incredible.’ in the following line 17. This gaze continues through the pause in line 18, and through the repetition of Incredible in line 19, which is combined with an expanded nominal form ‘hija mía’ ‘daughter of mine’ (Stivers 2007). This vocative design explicitly references the mother-daughter relationship, but in a notably marked way compared to the lexicalized form mi hija ‘my daughter’, pronounced [ˈmi.xa]. Following this, Mom switches to the usted reference form, which she uses through the end of line 26 for a total set of six morphological references of this sort in rapid succession.

As we have seen in previous examples, Mom’s deployment of usted mobilizes the pronoun’s semantics of distance; but here, this grammatical shift contributes specifically to the assessment action being undertaken in the turn. Mom is effectively embodying a (moral) stance toward the just-completed telling (cf. Goodwin & Goodwin 1987, 1992): by shifting person reference forms, she grammatically revokes the stance of intimacy with her daughter, distancing herself from her daughter’s just-recounted actions and thereby negatively assessing them. This negative assessment is even clearer when we take into account the juxtaposition of usted with the immediately prior vocative ‘hija mía’ ‘daughter of mine’. Given that it is common practice throughout Latin America to use usted to refer to young children (both to teach deferential forms from an early age and to reprimand; Lipski 1994), the pairing of usted with ‘hija mía’ indexes the respective identities of misbehaving child and chastising parent, even despite the fact that this daughter is now in her late twenties.

In the immediately subsequent turn (lines 27–28), the daughter responds to this linguistic invocation of social distance—and the negative assessment/sanctioning action that this distance was mobilized to achieve—by offering up an account that is noticeably emotionally charged: raised pitch and volume, careful pronunciation, upward gaze (lack of eye contact). Mom affiliates with this show of emotion ‘Ya sé’ ‘I know’, lines 30/32), thereby making a move to reestablish a sense of intimacy and common ground with her daughter through a reciprocal troubles-telling (Igual yo ... ‘Same I ...’, line 32) (Jefferson 1988). By the time the next turn that mobilizes a second-person reference is produced in line 41, usted has been abandoned and the interactants have returned to the intimacy of vos as Mom narrates a similar experience that recently happened to her. That is, with the negative assessment complete and a new affiliative stance and action now underway, a recalibration of identities—and therefore of person reference formulations—occurs, and the storytelling continues.

The final example we will analyze, taken from a phone call between two Colombian friends (Nancy and Alejandra), reinforces the salience of sequence organization in the selection of linguistic reference. In addition to the distancing relational work that usted has been mobilized to accomplish in previous examples, sociolinguistic research on pronominal forms in Colombian dialects of Spanish has documented the use of usted to display
extreme familiarity/closeness, this form alternating with vos as the other pronominal option in the speakers' repertoire (Buesa Oliver & Flórez 1954, Lipski 1994:213–14, Montes Giraldo 1982, Placencia 2010, Uber 1985). This sort of reference, seen in excerpt 11 below, is referred to in the Hispanist tradition as the *usted de cariño/confianza* or ‘usted of love/trust’ (Hummel et al. 2010:16).

In this exchange, Nancy is telling Alejandra the recent goings-on in her/her family members’ lives. Using the baseline reference form for these interactants, Nancy prefacess the announcement that her eldest sister, Paula, is currently in Colombia with oíste (‘did (you vos) hear’; line 2) to safeguard against this information being less than newsworthy for Alejandra (Sacks 1974, 1992, Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Alejandra enthusiastically affiliates with this news in line 6, thereby prompting Nancy to narrate some of Paula’s adventures in Colombia through line 24. When Alejandra comes in in overlap in line 25 to show affiliation with this telling, Nancy quickly overlaps that turn in progress to announce that she has another piece of gossip to share that is particularly scandalous, namely, that a relative of hers has a year-and-a-half-old child that no one in the family knew about prior to the trip to Colombia. The switch in person reference design (line 27) used to make this announcement serves to enhance the speaker’s claim of above-average newsworthiness.

(11) Nancy and Alejandra: ‘Chisme’

01 ALE: No: pero:_
   no but
   ‘No: but:’

02 NAN: Ay oíste,=
   aym*heard.vos*
   ‘Ay did (you vos) hear,’

03 =Tengo a mi hermana en Col-la: mayor, Paula?
   have.1sgprt my sister in Col-the: oldest P
   ‘I have my sister in Col-the: oldest, Paula?’

04 ALE: S[i_]
   ‘Yes_’

05 NAN: [está en Colombia.
   is.3sgin Colombia
   ‘is in Colombia.’

06 ALE: SI?*
   yes
   ‘YEA:H?’

22 NAN: .hhhh En:tonces Paula se fue para allá un tiempo;
   then P self went.3sg for there a time
   ‘.hhhh So Paula went away to there for a bit;’

23 Ay mi hija se encontró con su viejo amo:r=
   aymy daughter self found.3sg with her old love
   ‘Ay my dear she found herself with her old love;’

16 The audio for this excerpt is publicly available through TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007).
24 [Y ella está feliz porque encontró a su hombre porque encontró a su hombre]...

25 ALE: [Está que no quiere que no quiere...]

26 [volcome back]

27 NAN: [Oiga, otro chisme, listen usted to me other gossip]

28 ALE: [hh what]

29 NAN: [.tch no sabe una cosa. You USTED know a thing.]

30 Que: el marido de ella el viejo? That the husband of her the old guy?

31 ALE: [Mm.

32 NAN: [Con la sobrina, recuerda? With the niece remember USTED]

33 ALE: Sí sí sí. Yeah yeah yeah.

34 NAN: [Oiga tiene una niña de alguien. listen usted to me has 3sg a girl of
d][Listen usted up has 3sg a girl]

35 Año y medio. Year and half.

36 En parte es bueno para nosotros sabés por qué? In part is 3sg good for us know vos for what.

37 [.hhh En parte es bueno para nosotros sabés por qué?]

38 ALE: [Mm.

39 NAN: [.hh Porque decían que nosotros= because like said 3pt that we

40 [.hh Because like- they were saying that we=

41 =le estábamos quitando la honra a la muchachita, ... her were 1pt taking away the honor PRT the girl.DIM

42 [=we were taking away the little girl’s honor, ...]
Nancy’s *¿Qué otro chisme!* (‘Listen, up More gossip!’; line 27) invokes a sense of extreme intimacy. This sequential shift constitutes a marked reference form and serves to categorize the gossip to come as also marked: this is not just another piece of ordinary news; this is special, ‘insider-only’ gossip. Preannouncing the news in this way not only allows Nancy to regain the interactional floor, but it also signals to Alejandra what manner of uptake will eventually be expected in response to this telling (Maynard 2003, Sacks 1974, Schegloff 2007b:37–44, Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Note that this reference form is mobilized across the entirety of the telling, thereby continuing the categorization of Alejandra as a special ‘insider’, as well as maintaining the level of excitement of this news (lines 29, 32, 34, and in lines that have been omitted due to space considerations).

The sequence of events involved in this piece of gossip is brought to a close in line 59, after which the teller (Nancy) begins to offer some commentary on those events as a whole. At this point, given that the story itself has been told and excited affiliation has been provided by the recipient, Nancy shifts back to the unmarked vos form in line 60 as part of her transitioning out of the action of gossip-telling itself and into an assessment thereof: ‘En parte es bueno para nosotros sabés por qué? ‘In part it is good for us (you, vos) know why?’, the large prefatory in-breath further delineating this sequential shift. The friends then continue their commentary on the events of the telling across several turns that use this baseline reference form.

The examples in this section have illustrated that, just as was the case in institutional settings, ordinary talk between familiar interactants can make relevant the recalibration of stances, identities, and social relationships over the course of a single interaction. Linguistic resources for referring to recipients combine with various other aspects of turn design to invoke a landscape of identities that contributes to or accounts for the action objective of a given turn at talk. Although their relative identity statuses as, for example, mother and daughter may be fixed, coparticipants’ identity stances are not preestablished or otherwise immutable, and thus neither are the reference forms that those interactants use to refer to one another over the course of an interaction.

6. Summary and discussion. In his famous work on variation in sentence structure, Dwight Bolinger (1972b:71) observes that:

There are situations where the speaker is constrained by a grammatical rule, and there are situations where he chooses according to his meaning … ; but there are no situations in the system where ‘it makes no difference’ which way you go. This is just another way of saying that every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other.

The present analysis has examined the real-time production of second-person singular (T/V) references in Spanish talk-in-interaction, a choice that is inherently not constrained by any grammatical rule because all of the options make reference to the speaker’s singular interlocutor. In line with Bolinger’s claim above, far from ‘making no difference’, selection of a reference form in Spanish demonstrates an orientation to, as well as a mobilization of, the underlying semantics of the different pronominal options in a given dialect’s repertoire. In a particular dialect, usted may typically embody a sense of deference or distance between the interlocutors, while tú may convey sameness and social intimacy; nonetheless, as we have demonstrated, social distance or intimacy between coparticipants in interaction is not absolute (cf. e.g. Brown & Gilman 1960:255), but rather can be transformed over the course of a stretch of talk, indexed grammatically through switches in recipient reference forms.

The examples analyzed here were purposefully selected to represent (i) several dialects from across the Spanish-speaking world (e.g. some tuteante, others voseante), (ii) variations in individual-level demographic features (e.g. gender, age, social status), (iii)
a variety of relationships between the interactants (i.e. from complete strangers to best friends and relatives), and (iv) a range of situational contexts (i.e. institutional and ordinary settings). The examples also illustrated pronominal switching in various discursive positions and in conjunction with a diverse set of social actions: to stave off a forthcoming rejection (ex. 3), in response to an epistemic challenge (ex. 4, 6, and 8), to index unfamiliarity or identity ambiguity (ex. 9), to provide a negative assessment (ex. 10), and to enhance newsworthiness and mobilize an appropriate response (ex. 11). In addition, switches were shown to occur in both directions on the intimacy-distance spectrum—from more intimate to more distant, and from more distant to more intimate. What is argued to bind this diversity of cases together is the interactants’ mobilization of the T/V distinction in the service of social action.

Paralleling Oh’s (2010) research on Korean pronouns, which are semantically coded for degrees of spatial distance, second-person reference forms in Spanish are unambiguously semantically coded to convey degrees of social distance. Notwithstanding, as has been illustrated, the ground-level invocation and in-the-moment pragmatic meaning of social distance/intimacy is based not only on relatively ‘static’ aspects of identity such as social class, age, gender, and so forth—or even on institutionally defined roles such as caller/call-taker or interviewer/interviewee—but also on the various interactionally emergent features of identity that are invoked through interactants’ pursuits of their goals for action. This analysis therefore supports previous crosslinguistic research on a variety of grammatical resources in evidencing the inextricable link between semantics and pragmatics (cf. Enfield 2003): because person reference designs are inherently deployed in conjunction with social actions, and because social actions are inherently shaped by the contexts and sequences in which they occur, the precise pragmatic import of these semantically binary pronominal options is an emergent and co-constructed feature of the ongoing discourse.

Interactants may adopt a variety of stances—vis-à-vis the topics under discussion and vis-à-vis one another—over the course of an interaction as they work to convey action. The present examination has provided an illustration of the precise role that grammar can play in this process: when a speaker switches reference forms, s/he indexes that a novel set of identities—and therefore a novel social relationship between those identities—is interactionally relevant at that moment in the talk. That is, the relevance of a new identity framework is grammatically ‘talked into being’ (Heritage 1984) by mobilizing the semantics of the T/V distinction, in the service of accomplishing or accounting for the action in progress. Deictic forms of this sort therefore exemplify how grammar itself can be deployed as a membership categorization device in interaction.

It is this social-interactional reality that necessitated an analytic distinction between status and stance in our understandings of identity and of the social relationship between the interlocutors. Because our identities are infinitely divisible and so multifaceted, how different components thereof come to bear on any sequence of talk must be understood as contextualized and content-driven—in the actual interaction—not superimposed by the researcher in a top-down fashion. Schegloff (1987:219) provides the following example of a doctor and patient interacting in a medical setting:

The fact that they are ‘in fact’ respectively a doctor and a patient does not make those characterizations ipso facto relevant … ; their respective ages, sex, religions, and so on, or altogether idiosyncratic and ephemeral attributes (for example, ‘the one who just tipped over the glass of water on the table’) may be what is relevant at any point in the talk.

Similarly, as seen in excerpt 4, for example, the fact that both the interviewer and interviewee are lawyers is not oriented to as relevant at each and every moment in the inter-
action. Nonetheless, when the interviewee’s legal knowledge is challenged, this identity becomes newly relevant in the construction of her response. Although she does not make an overt statement that her perspective is based on her status as a lawyer, the speaker nonetheless mobilizes the T/V distinction to grammatically index her own and the interviewer’s equivalent access to legal knowledge. This grammatically encoded identity stance is what provides the account for her rejection of the interviewer’s challenge.

Grammatically enacted identities may actively reduce the social distance between the interlocutors—for example, to emphasize shared access to knowledge based on a mutually shared identity (ex. 4); alternatively, the in-the-moment social distance between coparticipants can be amplified—for example, to embody and underscore a relative lack of shared common ground (ex. 9). Regardless of the direction of the switch, as was evidenced in each of the examples discussed here, the negotiation of identity does not happen to speakers, but rather is co-constructed by speakers. In excerpt 3, for instance, the 911-caller’s shift from nondeferential vos to deferential used actively orients to the call-taker’s newly indexed gatekeeper identity as part of an attempt to stave off the forthcoming rejection of service. In mobilizing grammatical resources such as second-person reference forms in this way—to invoke the relevance of identities for the purposes of social action—interactants not only demonstrate an orientation to the semantic and pragmatic significance of those resources, but they also collaboratively recreate or renew those meanings on a turn-by-turn basis in actual talk.

Once the action (or series of actions) being attempted through the invocation of these novel identities has been completed, a speaker can then shift back to the coparticipants’ unmarked form. But these switches back to an unmarked design are also themselves marked in that they constitute a departure from the immediately prior reference formulation—mobilizing the formerly unmarked form now ‘for another first time’ (Garfinkel 1967:9). Accordingly, these switches too are recalibrations of the identity landscape and thus occur at action-relevant points in the ongoing talk. In excerpts 5–8, Gonzalo Alegría transitions to the marked used form to invoke an asymmetrical distribution of knowledge regarding tax law in response to Palacios’s challenge of his plan. The switch back to tÚ comes once that action is complete and a new one (promising) occasions the embodiment of common ground (ex. 7), a stance that again shifts in the face of yet another epistemic challenge from Palacios (ex. 8). Similarly, in the last excerpt (11), Nancy mobilizes a shift to used to mark a piece of gossip as particularly newsworthy for her interlocutor as a close family friend; she maintains that reference form throughout the entirety of the telling, and then shifts back to vos when affiliative uptake has been provided, the activity of telling concludes, and commentary on the events recounted begins.

Thus any shift—be it from an unmarked to a marked reference form, or from a marked to an unmarked reference form—is shaped by the identity-relevant stances and actions of the sequence in progress: the progression of talk can make particular actions relevant, actions can invite certain identity frameworks that are best aligned to achieve those actions, and linguistic reference forms—including switches—are one grammatical resource through which these local, moment-by-moment identity stances can be invoked. Simultaneously, because person references can be mobilized to index the relevance of identities that aid in the achievement of action and, in turn, compose sequences of talk, person reference forms help shape the emergent context and overall sequence organization of the interaction as well. Such linguistic tools allow copartici-
pants in discourse to continuously recalibrate and renew their context as they progress through talk. The discursive significance of second-person pronominal options is therefore not only constituted by, but also helps to constitute, the moment-by-moment negotiation of context, action, and identity in interaction.

7. Conclusions and avenues for future research. This analysis embodies a methodological and theoretical shift in the linguistic study of reference forms—combining sociolinguistic research on the inventory of options with investigation of the moment-by-moment deployment of those options in naturally occurring sequences of interaction. The dialects of Spanish analyzed in this study are diverse in terms of their pronominal repertoires—for example, *tuteante* vs. *voseante*—and it would have been common practice to analyze speakers from Los Angeles, California, separately from those from Medellín, Colombia, for example. We similarly could have taken as our point of departure the participants’ genders, racial characteristics, or relative socioeconomic statuses vis-à-vis one another, or the sort of situated context in which they found themselves. In contrast, here I posited that a common feature linking these otherwise quite divergent dialects of Spanish, and cutting across individual-level features of identity, is the more general discursive practice of mobilizing T/V reference forms to invoke identity stances in the service of social action. Although speakers of some dialects (e.g. Colombian Spanish) may make more active use of this strategy than speakers of other dialects, the ability to shift second-person forms in accordance with one’s emergent objectives appears to exist cross-diagnostically as a ‘members’ resource’ (Garfinkel 1967).

This naturally invites the question of just how universal such an interactional strategy might be. We focused here on a two-way distinction: *tú* and *usted*, or *vos* and *usted*. How might other dialects that have three or more options (e.g. Chilean, Uruguayan, etc. Spanish) fit into this paradigm? Furthermore, what systematic role does the mobilization of other forms of address for second persons—for example, terms of endearment (*mi hija* ‘my daughter’), diminutive constructions (*Anita* ‘little Ana’), or even lexical vs. morphological expressions of second-person reference forms themselves—play in combining with these and other grammatical resources to produce action in interaction?

Crosslinguistic comparison with data from other languages that possess grammatically indexed T/V distinctions is also necessary. Friedrich (1966), for instance, analyzes alternation between *ty* and *vy* in nineteenth-century Russian novels, and Ostermann (2003) describes variation between *você* and *a senhora* in two gendered institutional contexts (an all-female police station and a feminist crisis intervention center in Brazil). Future research is necessary to determine to what extent pronominal switching is used as a resource more generally in everyday interaction in these and other languages.

The existence of a T/V distinction in a variety of typologically distinct languages (cf. Braun 1988) suggests that managing identity and social distance/closeness is of potential universal relevance to humans’ use of language in interaction. It is therefore necessary to also examine languages without an overt T/V distinction in their grammar (such as modern English) so as to uncover what other linguistic resources can be mobilized to similar effect.

Further crosslinguistic and cross-cultural comparison of naturalistic discourse, in diverse settings, will allow us to better investigate the ways in which social and cultural norms for referring to one’s interlocutor are invoked, oriented to, and thereby recreated—not in the abstract, but rather at the ground level of situated language use, as interactants grammatically co-construct identity in the service of their interactional goals.
APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Symbols used in the transcription of speech follow the conventions laid out in Jefferson 2004 and Hepburn & Bolden 2013. The most frequently used symbols appear below.

Symbols Used in Transcription

? . ; _ Punctuation is designed to capture intonation, not grammar: question mark for fully rising terminal intonation; comma for slightly rising ‘continuing’ terminal intonation; period for fully falling terminal intonation; semicolon for mid-low falling terminal intonation; and underscore for flat/level intonation.

[ ] Left-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk (or other behavior) begins.

] Right-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk (or other behavior) ends (if detectable).

(0.5) Periods of silence, in seconds. The example here indicates a half-second silence.

(.) ‘Micropause’ (i.e. a silence less than two-tenths of a second).

: Lengthening of the segment just preceding, proportional to the number of colons.

wor- A dash indicates an abrupt cut off, usually a glottal stop.

word Underlining indicates stress or emphasis.

WORD Exceptionally loud speech relative to the surrounding talk.

°word° Speech lower in volume relative to the surrounding talk.

↑word Marked pitch rise.

↓word Marked pitch fall.

= ‘Latching’ between lines or turn-constructional units (i.e. no silence between them).

<word> Speech delivered faster than the surrounding talk.

<word> Speech delivered slower than the surrounding talk.

hhh .hhh Audible aspiration, proportional to the number of hs. If preceded by a period, the aspiration is an in-breath. Aspiration internal to a word (e.g. laughter, sighing) is enclosed in parentheses.

( ) Talk too obscure to transcribe. Words or letters inside such parentheses indicate a best estimate of what is being said.

((looks)) Transcriptionist’s comments (e.g. for nonvocal behavior).

→ Arrows in the margin point to the lines of transcript relevant to the point being made in the text. Bolding is also used in the present article.

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