THE LOGIC OF PERSON MARKEDNESS: EVIDENCE FROM PRONOMINAL COMPETITION

IVY Sichel                                          MARTINA WILTSCHKO

University of California, Santa Cruz            ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

In some languages, such as Hebrew and German, a d-pronoun (a pronominal demonstrative form) may refer to a human. When it does, the use of the d-pronoun may be associated with a pejorative effect, implying a negative evaluation of the denoted individual (henceforth N(egative)-

42

effected). The N-effect is triggered, however, only under certain conditions. For example, when the d-pronoun is modified, no N-effect arises. This article examines the syntactic and pragmatic conditions under which this meaning emerges, and develops an account that integrates pronominal markedness and competition into the fold of conversational implicatures. The study addresses two questions: (i) What is the distribution of the N-effect? (ii) How is it linguistically encoded? Regarding (i), it is shown that the N-effect is triggered only when a personal pronoun could also have been used. This suggests that, everything else being equal, a personal pronoun is preferred over a d-pronoun; it also suggests that the N-effect is not intrinsically, or lexically, encoded. Regarding (ii), the N-effect must derive from the nonuse of a personal pronoun, and in this sense, it is related to markedness, and to systems that derive conversational implicatures. We argue that the use of a d-pronoun when a personal pronoun could also have been used gives rise to an implicature that the d-pronoun is associated with [−person], and we substantiate a theory of person as a contentful category that marks discourse participation.9

Keywords: d-pronouns, person, negative appraisal, implicature, expressive language

1. INTRODUCTION. In some languages, such as Hebrew (1) and German (2), demonstratives and determiners, respectively, can be used like pronouns and refer to humans. We refer to such forms as d-pronouns. In 1–2, the d-pronoun subjects may refer to human beings or to objects.1

(1) zot(i) / ha-hi gvoha. 
Z.F.SG / the-H.F.SG tall
‘This one/that one is tall.’

(2) Die ist gross. 
D.F.SG is tall
‘This/that one is tall.’

In some contexts, such as 1–2, the use of the d-pronoun triggers negative appraisal.2 We call this the N-effect. The N-effect is purely evaluative and lacks descriptive content; use of the d-pronoun implies a dismissive attitude on the part of the speaker toward the individual denoted by the pronoun. This is seen most clearly when the context mandates closeness and caring, as in 3–4, where speaker A refers to speaker B’s new girl-

9 For useful comments and questions, we wish to thank Pranav Anand, Isabelle Charnavel, Donka Farkas, Deniz Rudin, Yael Sharvit, Maziar Toosarvandani, and the late Yair Yitzhaki. We also thank students in Ivy Sichel’s seminars on pronouns at the Hebrew University and at UC Santa Cruz, and audiences at talks given at the Hebrew University, WCCFL 35 at the University of Calgary and WCCFL 36 at UCLA, the workshop on Pronouns and Competition at UC Santa Cruz, and at the linguistics department at UC Berkeley. We are grateful to three anonymous referees for thoughtful and constructive feedback. All errors remain our own. This article is dedicated to the memory of Yair Yitzhaki.

1 We gloss d-pronouns in all of our examples as the first letter of the word, plus inflectional material, for example, Z.F.SG for the Hebrew feminine singular proximate demonstrative zot, and D.F.SG for the German feminine singular d-pronoun die. Abbreviations used are as follows: acc: accusative, f: feminine, m: masculine, n: neuter, neg: negation, pl: plural, prt: particle, refl: reflexive, sg: singular.

2 A related effect is reported for Spanish d-pronouns (Duranti 1984), and Romanian and Hungarian (Donka Farkas, p.c.).

Printed with the permission of Ivy Sichel & Martina Wiltschko. © 2021.
friend, and B is sharing his feelings for her. Use of a d-pronoun in these contexts is jarring and odd, whereas the use of a personal pronoun would be unremarkable.

(3) A: rai’ti etmol et ha-xavera ha-xadaSa Selxa.
    saw.1 yesterday acc the-friend.F.SG the-new.F.SG your
    ‘I saw your new girlfriend yesterday.’
B: #zot ma ze xamuda.
    Z.F.SG what it cute.F
    ‘That one is so cute.’
B: #ani ma ze me’ohav be-zot.
    I what it in.love in-Z.F.SG
    ‘I’m so in love with that one.’

    I have yesterday your new friend-F seen
    ‘I saw your new girlfriend yesterday.’
B: #Die ist total nett.
    D.F.SG is totally nice
    ‘That one is totally nice.’
B: #Ich habe mich in die verliebt.
    I have refl in D.F.SG love
    ‘I have fallen in love with that one.’

Interestingly, the N-effect is only selectively triggered. In 5 and 6, for example, the d-pronoun is modified, and the N-effect is not triggered. Although here, too, the d-pronoun refers to B’s girlfriend, use of the d-pronoun is unremarkable.

(5) B: tir’e, hine ha-xavera ha-xadaSa Seli!
    look here the-friend.F.SG the-new.F.SG mine
    ‘Look, there’s my new girlfriend!’
A: eyze me-hen?
    which of-them
    ‘Which one of them?’
B: ha-xavera Seli hi zot im ha-nemaSim.
    the-friend.F.SG mine is Z.F.SG with the-freckles
    ‘My girlfriend is the one with the freckles.’

(6) B: Schau, dort ist meine neue Freund-in!
    look there is my.F.SG new.F.SG friend-F
    ‘Look, there’s my new girlfriend!’
A: Welche ist sie denn?
    which.F is she PRT
    ‘Which one is she?’
B: Die mit den Sommersprossen.
    D.F.SG with the freckles
    ‘The one with the freckles.’

This raises two questions, which we address in this article: (i) What is the distribution of the N-effect? and (ii) How is it linguistically encoded?

Regarding its distribution, we show that the N-effect is restricted to (i) human referents and (ii) contexts in which the d-pronoun could be replaced by a personal pronoun. Whereas the two forms freely alternate in 1–2, a personal pronoun is impossible with the addition of a modifier, and no N-effect is triggered. We discuss these contexts in detail in §2. We argue that d-pronouns and personal pronouns compete, and that a personal pro-
noun is preferred whenever possible (Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017); the choice of a d-pronoun triggers the N-effect. We argue, furthermore, that the N-effect is an inference, a type of scalar implicature that arises when the personal-pronoun alternative could have been used, but was not. Regarding its encoding, we show that the N-effect encodes just that: ‘not personal pronoun’, and in slightly more formal terms, the absence of PERSON. We take PERSON to be contentful and to encode the discourse role of subject, where bearers of PERSON are potential discourse subjects: entities that can communicate and actively participate in discourse. Choice of a d-pronoun over a personal pronoun implicates that the speaker does not consider the referent to be a valid discourse subject, someone whose opinions are worth considering, hence the air of dismissiveness. This is why the N-effect is restricted to humans; nonhumans are never potential discourse subjects to begin with.

The ability of a pronominal element to trigger a scalar implicature is surprising and has not yet been studied in depth, to the best of our knowledge; it has also rarely been attested (see n. 2; the most closely related phenomenon that we are aware of is the negative perception of John McCain’s use of the full DP that one to refer to Barack Obama in a presidential debate, discussed in Acton 2014). It is surprising because implicatures convey content, typically content that is associated with a preferred alternative that nevertheless was not chosen, but pronouns lack descriptive content. The use of some, for example, typically triggers the scalar implicature some but not all, due to a preference for all, which would have been used if it could have been. It is not obvious, though, that the landscape of pronouns is similarly structured by relations of asymmetrical entailment that could produce scalar inferences. While some pronouns may appear to stand in scalar relationships to each other, this type of relationship is purely syntactic: it has been claimed that some pronouns are associated with larger structures that contain the structure associated with other pronouns (Wiltschko 1998, Cardinaletti & Starke 1999, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017; but see Béjar 2003 for a semantic conception of pronominal features). Cardinaletti and Starke (1999), for example, argue for an economy principle minimize structure, which states a preference among pronouns for those with less structure whenever possible. However, even if it gives rise to scalar relations, structure alone cannot generate implicatures. For that, some notion of content is needed.

Previous work on definite and demonstrative determiners such as the, this, and that has identified a number of inferences and asymmetries among determiners, such as a distancing inference associated with the use of plural definite descriptions like the Americans, due to nonuse of we Americans (Acton 2014, 2019), or a distal inference for that triggered by the nonuse of this, which encodes proximate (Wolter 2006). In line with previous work on inferences in the domain of determiners, we argue that implicatures are triggered within the pronominal domain as well, and that these are scalar implicatures, derived via asymmetrical entailment relations among the set of pronominal alternatives. The grammatical nature of the alternation between pronominal elements makes a particularly strong case for inferential meaning that is triggered by preferences and competition. As we show, differences in the distribution of personal pronouns and d-pronouns result in grammatical gaps in the availability of the personal pronoun, and under these circumstances, the N-effect does not arise. In other alternatives, based exclusively on meaning, by contrast, this sharp empirical contour may remain elusive. Another central contribution of the study of the N-effect is the relation that it reveals between personal pronouns and definite expressions, which until now has been completely obscured. As we show, the denotation of personal pronouns asymmetrically entails the denotation of d-pronouns. This conclusion bears, more broadly, on the
semantic structure of the landscape of nominal expressions, in which it is commonly as-
sumed that demonstratives and definites are more informative or marked than personal
more recently Ahn 2019, among others). If we are correct that personal pronouns asym-
metrically entail d-pronouns, the influential view that personal pronouns are the
pronominal instantiation of a definite DP cannot be quite correct in its simplest for-

The N-effect is a special kind of implicature, rooted in pronominal features rather
than descriptive content and determined by the presence of a pronominal alternative.
This combination of properties places pronominal features at the center of our analysis
and highlights three related issues at the intersection of markedness and interpretation.

First, does the N-effect represent the presence of some feature, in other words, a
marked feature, or the absence of a feature, an unmarked feature? If the latter, what is
the status of the unmarked feature: is it represented as a negative value of a present fea-
ture, or is it inferred? The logic of implicatures dictates that the N-effect should be de-
rived from the absence of a feature, that is, its negation (e.g. some, not all). This bears
directly on the nature of grammatical features and whether they are grammatically en-
coded as binary or privative. We argue that the N-effect expresses the absence of a fea-
ture in d-pronouns, specifically person; along with other work, we argue that person
is associated with personal pronouns and is semantically contentful (Béjar 2003, 2008,
Sauerland 2008a, Harbour 2016, Pancheva & Zubizaretta 2018), and that this negative
value is inferred, not represented as such.

Second, what is the basis for preferences within the class of pronouns, of the kind
that can generate implicatures? Classic Gricean theory included at least two kinds of
preference scales, corresponding to distinct maxims: an informativity scale, based on
asymmetrical entailment, associated with the first quantity maxim (‘Say as much as
you can’), and a formal scale, based on complexity or length, associated with the man-
ner maxim. It is hard to know, a priori, whether a personal pronoun and a d-pronoun are
to be treated as having essentially the same kind of form and contrasting in informativ-
ity, or as having essentially the same meaning and contrasting in form. However, we
may not have to decide between these options. There have been numerous cracks in
the classic Gricean picture, among them the realization that both types of preference
scales—based on informativity-entailment and based on length-complexity—operate in
tandem to limit the set of relevant alternatives (Katzir 2007, Fox & Katzir 2011, Marty
2017, Acton 2019, Ahn 2019), so it is no longer a matter of choosing between types of
scales. Since formal scales related to length-complexity cannot, on their own, generate
contentful implicatures, the empirical question that we address is whether pronouns
may be structured along an entailment dimension, such that some pronoun(s) may
asymmetrically entail another, on a par with the relationship between all and some. We
argue that personal pronouns asymmetrically entail d-pronouns, and we motivate a
scale for comparison based on pronominal denotations: the denotation of the personal
pronoun is included in the denotation of the d-pronoun, as in Figure 1. The N-effect
arises exactly when the denotation of the d-pronoun is identical to the denotation of the
personal pronoun: in these graphic terms, when the denotation of the d-pronoun falls
within the inner circle. This will happen when a unique salient referent is established,
and the d-pronoun is not used to discriminate.

Since the personal pronoun denotes the subset, it is the more informative expression
2019, we assume that informativity is weighed against complexity, such that expres-
sions are better, hence preferred, if (i) they are more informative, without being more complex, or (ii) if they are shorter, or simpler, without compromising informativity. Since the personal pronoun is more informative, without being more complex than the d-pronoun, it is the preferred form when it is usable. This does not preclude situations in which the d-pronoun is more informative, such as when it is used to discriminate. We argue below that personal pronouns cannot be used in this way. Therefore, under these circumstances, informativity would favor the d-pronoun. As expected, an N-effect is not triggered.

Third, since the content of the implicature refers to a grammatical feature, PERSON, and since such grammatical features have been claimed to be presupposed rather than asserted (Sauerland 2008a, and more recently Charnavel 2019, contra Sudo 2012), it is possible that the implicature is derived from a presupposition. We suggest that it may be, and that it would constitute an anti-presupposition. We show that it patterns, at least to some extent, with other implicated presuppositions (Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008b).

The data reported here stem from the authors’ introspection as well as consultation with other native speakers. Despite the apparent subtlety of the N-effect, we have found judgments to be surprisingly consistent. For the German data, it is important that our example sentences be pronounced in a variety of German that can be used in colloquial speech. This is because the use of d-pronouns is sometimes considered to be restricted to spoken language, and arguably Standard German is not natively spoken by anyone. For example, Weiß (1998, 2004) gives extensive arguments for the preference, in linguistic investigation, for data from a spoken regional variant over written data (see also Auer 2004).

The article is organized as follows. We first examine the distribution of the N-effect in more detail (§2), including environments defined syntactically, and in terms of contexts of use, where referential distinctions play a role. We then spell out our proposal in more detail in §3 and turn to motivate it in §4 and §5. In §4 we argue that the N-effect is rooted in the absence of a PERSON specification, and in §5 we argue against a calculation based exclusively on length-complexity, and we derive the N-effect as an implicated presupposition. Section 6 concludes.

2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE N-EFFECT. In this section, we show that the N-effect arises only when the referent is human (§2.1) and a d-pronoun is used when a personal pronoun could also have been used (§2.2).

2.1. THE RESTRICTION TO HUMANNESS. The first restriction is reference to humans. The N-effect arises only if the d-pronoun refers to a human individual (and is not used deictically; see more below). For inanimate referents, no N-effect ever arises.
(7) a. zot  gvoha.  Z.f.sg tall ‘This one is tall.’
   b. Die  ist gross.  D.f.sg is tall ‘This/that one is tall.’

(Said of a person: there is an N-effect; said of a nonhuman: no N-effect.)

The restriction to human referents may suggest a characterization of the N-effect in terms of dehumanization, similar to the use of a neuter pronoun (German es or English it), which typically refers to inanimate individuals. The N-effect appears to be subtler, however, than what an analysis in terms of dehumanization or animacy would lead one to expect. Dehumanization via the use of a neuter pronoun creates a much stronger effect. We argue below that this kind of underspecified negativity is to be thought of in terms of the notion of discourse subject and the structure of discourse roles.

2.2. Competition with personal pronouns. The d-pronouns in 1 and 2 can be replaced with a personal pronoun, as shown in 8–9.

(8) zot(i) / hi  gvoha.  Z.f.sg / she  tall ‘This one/she is tall.’

(9) Die / sie  ist gross.  D.f.sg / she  is tall ‘This one/she is tall.’

In this subsection, we establish the significance of this alternation: the N-effect arises only in contexts in which the d-pronoun can be felicitously replaced with a personal pronoun. In other words, it is restricted to contexts of competition. Consider again the examples in 5 and 6, repeated below as 10 and 11, which involve modification of the d-pronoun by a prepositional phrase. In this configuration the personal pronoun is ill-formed, and the N-effect does not arise.

(10) [DP zot / *hi [PP im  ha-nemaSim]]  gvoha.  Z.f.sg / *she  with-the-freckles  tall ‘The one with the freckles is tall.’

(11) [DP Die / *sie [PP mit  den Sommersprossen]]  ist gross.  D.f.sg / *she  with  the  freckles  is tall ‘The one with the freckles is tall.’

Similarly, if the d-pronoun is modified by a relative clause (12–13), a personal pronoun cannot be used. No N-effect arises.

(12) [DP zot / *hi [CP Se-yac’a  im  dani]]  gvoha.  Z.f.sg / *she  that-went.out  with  Dani  tall ‘The one that went out with Dani is tall.’

(13) [DP Die / *sie [CP die  mit  der Dani befreundet  ist]]  ist gross.  D.f.sg / *she  D.f.sg with the  Dani  friended  is  is tall ‘The one who is friends with Dani is tall.’

There are additional contexts where d-pronouns are the only choice, and importantly, these contexts vary across Hebrew and German. This supports our generalization, which refers to an alternation, not to specific configurations: an N-effect does not arise where a personal pronoun could not be used.

Consider first German. German d-pronouns are formally identical to relative pronouns, and personal pronouns are distinct. Therefore, in this environment too, this form does not compete with a personal pronoun. We thus predict that the N-effect will not be triggered, and it is not.
Die Frau, [die / *sie] gross ist, ist ins Zimmer gekommen.  

The woman D.F.SG / *she tall is is in the room come

‘The woman who is tall came into the room.’

The same generalization holds in Hebrew, though the contexts vary. D-pronouns do not compete with personal pronouns in presentational contexts, in clefts, and as reciprocals, and the N-effect does not arise (Yitzhaki 2015).

Consider first presentational contexts. The use of a demonstrative pronoun in this context is special, as seen, for example, in English, where this/that may seem to correspond to a human (see Moltmann 2013 for analysis in terms of intensional objects). In this context, personal pronouns are ill-formed, and the N-effect does not arise.

a. {zot / *hi} dina.  
Z.F.SG / *she Dina

‘This/that/it is Dina.’

b. {ze / *hu} dani.  
Z.M.SG / *he Dani

‘This/that/it is Dani.’

c. {zot / *hi} [iSa yafa].  
Z.F.SG / *she woman beautiful

‘This/that/it is a beautiful woman.’

The same holds for clefts: d-pronouns do not compete with personal pronouns, and the N-effect does not arise.

a. {ze / *hu} aviv Se-ohev lir’ot hisardut.  
Z.M.SG / *he Aviv that-likes to.watch Survivor

‘It’s Aviv that likes to watch Survivor.’

b. {zot / *hi} aviva Se-ohevet lir’ot hisardut.  
Z.F.SG / *she Aviva that-likes to.watch Survivor

‘It’s Aviva that likes to watch Survivor.’

Finally, Hebrew reciprocals may be formed with d-pronouns, but they do not trigger an N-effect, as in 17a. This seems to be part of the same generalization: the N-effect arises only if the d-pronoun competes with the personal pronoun, and Hebrew reciprocals cannot be composed from personal pronouns, as in 17b.

a. *dani1 ve-dina2 histaklu ze1 al zot2.  
Dani and-Dina looked Z.M.SG at Z.F.SG

‘Dani and Dina looked at each other/one another.’

b. *dani1 ve-dina2 histaklu hu1 al hi2.  
Dani and-Dina looked he at she

c. *dani1 ve-dina2 histaklu exad1 al ha-Sniya2.  
dani and-dina looked one.M.SG at the-second.F.SG

‘Dani and Dina looked at one another.’

So far, the conditions that define the alternation have been syntactic, and refer to whether a personal pronoun is available in a given position alongside the d-pronoun. Another set of conditions refer to referential possibilities and contexts of use, and specifically to whether the d-pronoun is used to discriminate among multiple potential referents, in the way that demonstratives are used in contexts in which there is more than one qualifying referent (Roberts 2002, Wolter 2006, Ahn 2019, among others). D-pronouns in the two languages behave similarly in this respect. First, a d-pronoun

3 The only prior discussion of the phenomenon that we are aware of is in Yitzhaki 2015, a term paper in a seminar given by the first author, which reacted to our early ideas about the N-effect and competition.
may be used to discriminate, but it need not. Second, the N-effect is triggered only if the d-pronoun is not used to discriminate, and this occurs when a salient unique individual is already established in the context. In this case, d-pronouns are used just like personal pronouns, and indeed, a personal pronoun could also be used. The N-effect is triggered, as in the following contexts.

(18) [Context: A group of fans are watching the Eurovision Song Contest. Everyone’s favorite (Conchita Wurst) appears on screen.]
   a. zot od taft ’a et kulam.
      Z.F.SG yet surprise ACC everyone
      ‘This one will surprise everyone yet.’
   b. Die wird jetzt alle überraschen.
      D.F.SG will now all surprise
      ‘This one will surprise everyone.’

(19) a. dani xoSev se-zot od tenaceax.
    Dani thinks that-Z.F.SG yet win
    ‘Dani thinks that this one might yet win.’
   b. Der Dani glaubt dass die gewinnen wird.
      the Dani thinks that D.F.SG win will
      ‘Dani thinks that this one will win.’

When the use of the d-pronoun is discriminating, however, the N-effect disappears. This happens when several potential referents are available and the d-pronoun is used to pick out one particular referent, as in 20.

(20) [Context: A group of fans are watching the Eurovision Song Contest. A group of contestants appear on screen, including Conchita. Pointing at Conchita, one of the fans exclaims:]
   a. dani xoSev se-zot od tenaceax.
      Dani thinks that-Z.F.SG yet win
      ‘Dani thinks that this one might yet win.’
   b. Der Dani glaubt dass die gewinnen wird.
      the Dani thinks that D.F.SG win will
      ‘Dani thinks that this one will win.’

The generalization that the N-effect is triggered only if the d-pronoun is not being used to discriminate is further supported by the following observation. In environments with multiple antecedents, d-pronouns may have a disambiguating effect. In 21–22, for example, the use of the d-pronoun has to refer to the object in the first conjunct and cannot pick out the subject (Ariel 1990, Reinhart 1995, Sichel 2001, Bosch, Katz, & Umbach 2007, Hinterwimmer 2015). According to Hinterwimmer (2015), personal pronouns are ambiguous, while d-pronouns can only be resolved to antecedents that are not maximally salient in the preceding sentence.

(21) buS₁ diber etmol im Saron₂
    Bush spoke yesterday with Sharon
    ... ve-hu₁/₂ / ze₂ lo zaz milimeter.
    and-he / Z.M.SG not budge millimeter
    ‘Bush spoke yesterday with Sharon and he wouldn’t budge a millimeter.’

(22) Bush₁ hat gestern mit Sharon₂ geredet
    Bush has yesterday with Sharon spoken
    ... und er₁/₂ / der₂ ist auf nichts eingegangen.
    and he / D.M.SG is at nothing agreed
    ‘Bush has spoken with Sharon yesterday and he didn’t agree on anything.’
While the use of a personal pronoun would be compatible with both antecedents, the use of the d-pronoun would be a discriminating use, and no N-effect arises. Note that for the characterization of the notion of discriminating use that is relevant for the N-effect, it does not matter whether discrimination is deictic, as in 20, or anaphoric, as in 21–22. The characterization of the context of use that determines the appearance of the N-effect transcends the division into deixis and anaphora; what matters is the availability of a personal-pronoun alternative and that these, too, are contexts in which a personal pronoun could not be used. When d-pronouns are used to discriminate, no N-effect arises.

We predict, therefore, that even when they occupy the same positions, personal pronouns cannot be used in the same way to discriminate. This is what we observe in contexts with multiple antecedents, such as 21–22: a personal pronoun is grammatical in the position of the d-pronoun, but it is ambiguous. It is not used to discriminate. The same holds of the type of context in 20, with multiple potential referents. It is a bit trickier to establish this, since a personal pronoun is available and could even bear stress and be accompanied by a pointing gesture, as in 23.

(23) [Context: A group of fans are watching the Eurovision Song Contest. A group of contestants appear on screen, including Conchita. Pointing at Conchita, one of the fans exclaims:]

a. dani xoSev se-HI od tenaceax.
   Dani thinks that-she yet win
   ‘Dani thinks that she might yet win.’

b. Der Dani glaubt dass sie gewinnen wird.
   the Dani thinks that she win will
   ‘Dani thinks that she will win.’

Nevertheless, the personal pronoun is not being used here to discriminate: it must have been previously established that the referent is Conchita Wurst, and the speaker is now using the pronoun to track that referent. This does not preclude adding emphasis, or even a physical gesture, perhaps to indicate joy, surprise, or any other emotion that Conchita, of all contestants, could be the winner. To the extent that a personal pronoun cannot be used to discriminate, and discriminating uses of d-pronouns are not accompanied by an N-effect, we conclude that the distribution of the N-effect is relativized to both syntactic conditions and use conditions, present whenever a personal pronoun is an available alternative. We lay out the ingredients of our proposal in the next section, and turn to motivate it in §4 and §5.

3. The Proposal. We have seen that the N-effect is a special kind of evaluative expression: rather than descriptive content, the evaluation is based in pronominal features and is determined by the presence of an alternative. The analysis we develop is built on these two properties. We argue that the N-effect arises as the result of a competition be-

---

4 How are d-pronouns used to discriminate? There is no single designated way: the discriminating use of d-pronouns may involve stress, pointing (see 20), or antitopicality (d-pronouns avoid antecedents that are discourse topics (Bosch & Umbach 2006); see 21–22). The locative distinction encoded in some demonstrative pronouns (this vs. that) may also serve to discriminate, but it is not essential. The fact that the N-effect is associated with all of these uses suggests that the correct characterization of d-pronouns and demonstrative pronouns is in terms of this broad notion of discrimination (see for example Wolter 2006 for this notion in the context of demonstratives), and not in terms of any of the more specific modes, such as pointing or discourse anaphora. We set aside how exactly this is encoded semantically (see Wolter 2006 and Ahn 2019 for related proposals). Arguably, the antitopicality requirement is in fact epiphenomenal, deriving from the necessity of discrimination; a restriction to a nontopic antecedent appears to be equivalent to a restriction to contexts with multiple potential antecedents, since a nontopic DP implicates a topic DP.
tween personal pronouns and d-pronouns, where the personal pronoun is the preferred form. We proceed in three steps, each step corresponding to a central ingredient.

First, we argue that the N-effect arises from the grammar of pronominal features. More specifically, we show that the N-effect is derived from the absence of a specification for person, owing to the status of the d-pronoun as a definite description. In this sense, it contrasts with personal pronouns, which are the exemplary bearers of person (roughly, the equivalent of π in earlier work, such as Béjar 2003, 2008, Harbour 2016). We consider person to have semantic content, and develop the idea that this category encodes a broad notion of subjectivity corresponding to a discourse role. An entity is specified for person if it qualifies as a discourse subject, someone who can communicate, in addition to being referred to or communicated about; an entity is a discourse object if it can only be referred to or be communicated about. We propose that the d-pronoun, in contrast, does not encode person, and hence suggests that the referent might not be characterized as a potential participant: it is merely a discourse object to be referred to or communicated about. This objectification is the basis for the N-effect: a human referent designated by a d-pronoun is characterized as someone who can be communicated about but cannot be an active participant in a discourse. We can now understand why it would be restricted to humans: inanimate objects were never potential discourse subjects to begin with.

The next two ingredients constitute our analysis of competition between d-pronouns and personal pronouns. Assuming our understanding of person as denoting discourse subjects, and given that discourse subjects are a subset of discourse objects, it follows that the difference in person between a personal pronoun and d-pronoun corresponds to a subset relation, where the denotation of a personal pronoun is a subset of the denotation of a d-pronoun. As a proper subset, it is the more informative expression. At the same time, the personal pronoun is no more complex than a d-pronoun, and is possibly less complex. One of the d-pronominal forms in Hebrew is a synthetic form, containing the personal pronoun and a definite article: hi ‘she’ vs. ha-hi ‘that one.f’ (lit. ‘the-she’); the other d-pronoun cannot be decomposed and does not appear to be any less complex than a personal pronoun: hi ‘she’ vs. zot ‘this one.f’.

Given the logic of scalar implicatures, combined with the restriction of alternatives to forms of equivalent (or no lesser) complexity (Katzir 2007, Acton 2019), two things follow. First, since the personal pronoun is more informative than a d-pronoun, without being more complex, it is the preferred form whenever both are available; this excludes contexts in which the d-pronoun is used to discriminate. Second, the choice of a d-pronoun, when a personal pronoun could have been used, bears consequences. Specifically, the use of a d-pronoun triggers the implicature that the individual is not a potential speech act partici-

5 For a closely related conception of person as a marker of logophoric perspective, see Pancheva & Zubizarreta 2018, Sundaresan 2018. Obviously, a discourse subject must also qualify as a logophoric center. Our main reason for preferring the notion of discourse subject is based on two relations and their integration under this conception of person: on the one hand, the subdivisions within person (speaker, participant) refer to discourse roles, such that speaker asymmetrically entails participant; on the other hand, the relation between person/discourse subject and definiteness/discourse object refers to a broader, yet related, inclusion relation: the class of discourse subjects asymmetrically entails the class of discourse objects. These relations can all be integrated into a single hierarchy of discourse roles if person is based on a notion of discourse role, rather than on an epistemological notion, such as logophoric center, though the two are of course closely related. See further below, and especially n. 8.

6 Depending on the ultimate analysis of the discriminating use (see n. 4 for references), it is possible that in these contexts, d-pronouns are more informative than personal pronouns. Crucially, since this is when the N-effect is not triggered, this potential added informativity is not at play in the calculation of the preference and the inference that derives from it. See §5.1 for further discussion.
This is the source of the dismissiveness that we call the N-effect. These ingredients are motivated below.

4. Person on pronouns and the inclusion relation. A central property of the N-effect is that it does not affect the denotation of the pronoun or the truth of the sentence that contains it. As we have shown, the N-effect arises precisely when reference to a unique salient individual has already been secured, and the pronoun is not used to discriminate. Therefore, the N-effect cannot be restrictive—whatever content is provided does not serve to further restrict and identify the referent.

Taking this as a point of departure, the N-effect as an evaluative expression is special in two ways. First, because it arises in the absence of descriptive content of the kind associated, for example, with epithets, and second, because it appears only selectively, depending on the availability of an alternative. How exactly is this content derived? In the analysis to follow, we derive the N-effect as an inference rooted in the absence of a [+person] specification on d-pronouns.

In the remainder of this section we motivate the [+person] specification. In §4.1 we introduce the properties of the [+person] specification that we have in mind. We then consider whether the N-effect corresponds to the presence of a feature or its absence in §4.2. This is a crucial ingredient for the logic of markedness. It is also a crucial part of our argument that the N-effect is a scalar implicature, since scalar implicatures negate, or deny, the stronger alternative that was not chosen; a negative specification, as absence of a property, would be consistent with its status as a scalar implicature. Section 4.3 argues against the N-effect as the presence of specification for [distal] or [pejorative], and §4.4 further motivates our analysis of the N-effect as the absence of [+person].

4.1. The person sphere. We take person to be the containing category within the personal pronominal system, which has as its subsets the categories local and speaker. These categories are the atoms that build up the traditional first-, second-, and third-person categories. The relationship between them is hierarchical, similar, in part, to a classic feature geometry (Harley & Ritter 2002; but see also Harbour 2016 for the idea that these atoms are arranged in asymmetrical entailment relations within a non-geometric approach): person includes local, and local includes speaker. The system we propose is partially derived from markedness considerations and the inferences that it produces (McGinnis 2005, Sauerland 2008a). Within this system, negative values for features are inferred: it is inferred that second person is a local, non-speaker participant, and third person is a person, non-local participant. Since negative values are not represented as such, but are inferred (see §4.4), this means that these features are privative, not binary. Following Béjar 2003, 2008, Béjar & Rezac 2009, and Harbour 2016, the hierarchical arrangement of features is determined by entailment, such that person includes local, which includes speaker: in other words, speaker asymmetrically entails local and person, and local asymmetrically entails person. To this we add an outer circle, which includes the entities corresponding to the containing set of

7 More accurately, it triggers the implicature that the speaker is not certain that the individual is a potential speech act participant, which is then strengthened to ‘the speaker is certain that the individual is not a potential speech act participant’ (Sauerland 2004, 2008b). We continue to describe the N-effect in its strengthened interpretation throughout.

8 In what follows, we use the term person to refer to the contentful category and reserve the feature notation [+person] to refer to a valued feature, positive or negative. As should be clear from the text, we view the feature as a privative category; the feature-bracket notation is used only descriptively, as a convenient tool for referring, when necessary, to the presence of the feature vs. its absence.

9 This is not to say that the language faculty excludes all binary features.
pronoun and nonpronoun nominal expressions, which we label $\text{DR}_N$. This label should be read as discourse referent nominals, and the outer circle includes all entities referred to by nominals. D-pronouns correspond to this outer sphere. We refer to this as the person sphere, depicted in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. The person sphere.](image)

The idea that pronominal phi-features define semantic categories that are structured along a continuum of entailment relations which reaches up to nonpronoun nominals has a variety of predecessors: within classic feature geometries that include a nonpronoun root node $R$ (Cowper & Hall 2002, Harley & Ritter 2002), within proposals to include a minimal feature [d] in the outer layer of complex probes (Béjar & Kahanmuyipour 2017), and in structural accounts of the person hierarchy, where different kinds of pronominal DPs are associated with incremental structural sizes (Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002, Oxford 2017). The innovation of our proposal lies in the idea that such entailment relations may also structure the phi-features associated with pronominal arguments (as opposed to probes), such that an asymmetrical entailment relation holds also between the two outer layers, PERSON and $\text{DR}_N$, which we clarify immediately below. If we are correct, the relation of asymmetric entailment that holds between persons within the domain of pronouns stretches all the way up to nonpronoun DPs. To emphasize, we are not advocating for inclusion based on grammatical class membership (i.e. that the grammatical class of nominals which denotes discourse referents includes the grammatical class of pronouns), but more specifically for an entailment relation, such that the class of entities denoted by personal pronouns asymmetrically entails the class of entities denoted by definite descriptions and d-pronouns, in the way that the class of entities denoted by sheep asymmetrically entails the class of entities denoted by mammals.

Our focus in the person sphere is on the two outer circles, and the subset relation between those pronominal forms that are associated with PERSON and those that are not, that is, d-pronouns, which inhabit the outer layer. Our analysis of d-pronouns as the absence of PERSON provides new evidence of a very distinct sort for the existence of person as the pronominal superset. Under this view, even third person is (sometimes) specified as PERSON, contra classic assumptions following Benveniste 1966. For us it is
the difference between two types of third-person pronouns, encoded as **PERSON** and its absence, that is indicative of the linguistic reality of this category.\(^\text{10}\)

We take **PERSON** to be semantically contentful and propose that this notion encodes a broad notion of subjectivity corresponding to discourse role: an entity is associated with **PERSON** if it qualifies as a potential discourse participant—in other words, if it qualifies as a discourse **SUBJECT**, someone who can communicate, in addition to being referred to or communicated about (a discourse **OBJECT**).\(^\text{11}\) We propose that the d-pronoun, in contrast, is a definite-description pronominal, associated with the outer circle, the category corresponding to discourse referents: in other words, to discourse objects. As such, it is not specified for **PERSON**, hence is not marked as a potential participant.\(^\text{12}\) Below we show how this triggers the N-effect via a scalar implicature.

This explains the restriction to humans. Only humans can be demoted from discourse subject to discourse object with the use of a d-pronoun; a lamp, or a car, was never a discourse subject to begin with. The distinction between discourse subject and discourse object is distinct from the human/nonhuman distinction, and the N-effect is subtler than the use of an inanimate or nonhuman pronoun would be (see above). While it is true that only humans can be discourse subjects, it is not true that only nonhumans are discourse objects: the class of discourse objects contains the class of discourse subjects. This is the basis for the asymmetrical entailment relation that holds between **PERSON** and the outer layer, corresponding to definite expressions: the class of discourse subjects asymmetrically entails the class of discourse objects. Accordingly, the dismissiveness encoded in the N-effect should be characterized as objectification, rather than dehumanization.

### 4.2. Presence or Absence of a Feature?

We now turn to develop some empirical ways to identify the pronominal feature underlying the N-effect. We begin by choosing between the presence of a feature (a positive value in classical feature structure) and the absence of a feature (a negative value in classical feature structure). We use this terminological convention, and talk in terms of presence and absence, because it more accurately reflects the marked/unmarked asymmetry that is at the core of our proposal.

The N-effect must be rooted in pronominal features, or indexical features more broadly construed, such as spatial deixis (**this** vs. **that**). If it is encoded via object or spatial deixis, or even directly by a pejorative feature, it will be valued positively, that is, as the presence of some property or feature positively associated with d-pronouns (such as

\(^{10}\) A similar distinction within the class of third-person pronouns is well documented in Algonquian languages and corresponds to the contrast between **proximate** and **obviative** nominals (Bloomfield 1946). Some reason to suspect that these distinctions are closely related is that the proximate/obviative distinction is governed by a combination of syntactic, referential, and discourse considerations, similar to the choice between personal pronouns and d-pronouns. We speculate that obviative corresponds to the **PERSON**-lacking category of d-pronouns in Hebrew and German.

\(^{11}\) See Culy 1997 for an important distinction between a speech-oriented notion of logophoricity in terms of discourse role, as discussed above, and an epistemologically oriented notion, in terms of perspectival center (see also Reinhart 2000, Pancheva & Zubizaretta 2018, Sundaresan 2018, among others, for the linguistic significance of sentience; Charnavel & Mateu 2015 for antilogophoric pronouns; and Hinterwimmer & Bosch 2016 and Goebel 2018 for the proposal that d-pronouns are antilogophoric). Culy 1997 argues that the basic role of distinctively marked logophoric pronouns is in indirect discourse, embedded under predicates of speech, whereas their role as a perspectival center is only secondary.

\(^{12}\) There exist, of course, personal pronouns that can denote nonhumans, such as English **it** and German **es**, and weak pronouns of the Romance/Germanic variety. They all seem to be structurally deficient pronouns, and we speculate that the semantically contentful notion of **PERSON** that we are developing is located high in the functional sequence associated with pronouns, and specifically in the nominal speech act domain, in the sense of Ritter & Wiltshcko 2018, 2019.
distal/proximate or shared perspective due to indexicality, or pejorative) and will have a marked value: [+distal/proximate] or [+pejorative]. If it is encoded by person, it will be valued negatively, as the absence of a feature (i.e. [−person] within traditional feature geometries), and will have an unmarked value. An analysis in terms of indexical spatial features (either directly encoded or inferred) is implied within the literature on indexical expressives (Lakoff 1974, Naruoka 2006, Davis & Potts 2010, Acton & Potts 2014, Averintseva-Klisch 2016). The unmarked value, by contrast, is suggested by the logic of markedness and competition: the choice of a d-pronoun over a personal pronoun implies the absence of some property associated with the personal pronoun. The former route has already been taken for certain types of demonstratives (though not specifically for the N-effect), and we begin by outlining this approach and pointing to problems that we think disqualify the approach for the d-pronoun N-effect.

4.3. It is not distal or pejorative. The literature on expressives contains a sub-genre dedicated to the linguistic and philosophical study of pejorative (i.e. negative) meaning (Williamson 2009, Hom 2010, Hom & May 2013, the collection of papers in Finkbeiner et al. 2016; for pejorative indexicals see Duranti 1984, Mayes & Ono 1991, Naruoka 2006, Averintseva-Klisch 2016). The dismissive character of the N-effect may suggest that it should be classified as an expressive (also known as emotive or evaluative meaning) of this type. Indexicals that convey negative meaning show that the roots of negative meaning need not be lexical, and as such they raise the question of where exactly the negative ingredient resides. There is an ongoing discussion about the interaction of expressivity and indexicality, based, primarily, on demonstrative determiners in English (Lakoff 1974, Lyons 1977, Fillmore 1982, Davis & Potts 2010, Acton & Potts 2014; see more references below). Given the spatial and binary nature of demonstrative determiners such as this and that in this chair and that chair, it is tempting to relate demonstrative evaluativity to the spatial deictic system. Following the early insight of Lakoff (1974), much of the work on demonstrative determiners has considered their emotive meaning to be an extension of the spatial deictic system. We consider these ideas because of the connection to emotive meaning expressed by an indexical, broadly construed, even though they do not relate specifically to the N-effect. We argue that spatial deixis cannot be what underlies the d-pronoun N-effect.

Lakoff (1974) observed that English demonstrative determiners may express emotive meaning, in addition to their spatial orientation.

   b. How’s that throat? (Lakoff 1974:351)
   c. These IBMThinkPads are amazing! (Bowdle & Ward 1995:33)
   d. How’s that ‘hope’ and ‘change’ working out for you? (Potts & Schwarz 2010)

Lakoff sought to derive what she called ‘emotional deixis’ from spatial deixis, via the notion of solidarity: use of an emotive demonstrative indicates a desire on the part of the speaker to foster a sense of shared perspective with the addressee. This emotional solidarity is an extension of the perspectival alignment between speakers that indexical spatial expressions presuppose. Later work building on Lakoff’s insight has developed the idea that demonstratives may convey complex meanings involving exclamativity and a sense of heightened emotion (Davis & Potts 2010, Potts & Schwarz 2010), presumptions about shared attitudes and perspectives (Bowdle & Ward 1995, Wolter 2006, Acton & Potts 2014), and emotional closeness or distance (Kitagawa 1979, Ono 1994, Naruoka 2006, Averintseva-Klisch 2016; these studies focus on demonstrative determiners in Japanese and German).
To what extent is the N-effect observed with d-pronouns related to these emotive demonstrative determiners? Despite obvious similarities between d-pronouns and demonstrative determiners, the interpretive effect is actually distinct. Whereas in d-pronouns it is uncontroversially negative, for demonstrative determiners it is usually claimed to be exclamative and consistent with either positive or negative evaluation, depending on the context and the choice between this and that (Lakoff 1974, Wolter 2006). The d-pronoun N-effect is simpler along these other dimensions as well; it does not seem to involve the exclamativity observed for English demonstrative determiners, as in 24a and 24c. These interpretive differences seem to occasion a different kind of analysis.

There are two more properties that set the N-effect apart from emotive demonstrative demonstratives. First, the N-effect is restricted to human reference, whereas the use of emotive demonstratives is not, as seen, for example, in 24b–d. Second, the presence of an N-effect depends on the availability of a personal-pronoun alternative, a type of distribution that has not been observed for demonstrative determiners. Despite these differences, it is still conceivable that the N-effect in d-pronouns is similarly rooted in the spatial deixic system. On this hypothetical approach, binary locative coordinates such as here–there or this–that would be mapped onto the binary valuation good–bad, where good is derived from close to the speaker.

We reject this possibility since the N-effect is not part of a binary opposition in two respects. First, there is no corresponding positive effect. This would be surprising if here and there were mapped onto good and bad; if this were a straightforward metaphorical extension, why would the mapping proximate → good be blocked? Second, the German d-pronoun triggers an N-effect without being part of a spatial binary opposition; the d-pronoun is homophonous with the definite determiner, and its form varies only for gender, number, and case. This is unexpected if the N-effect were to derive from spatial deixis. Finally, in Hebrew, where a binary opposition is encoded, both forms may carry the N-effect, but it is the proximate form that carries the N-effect more robustly; with the distal form it is arguably subtler, showing that the mapping is not distal → bad. This, too, is unexpected if the N-effect were to derive from mapping spatial orientation onto evaluative orientation (i.e. distal → negative). Since we find no crosslinguistic correlation between the presence of a binary opposition and the presence of an N-effect, we conclude that the N-effect is not rooted in binary spatial deixis.

4.4. Scalar person. We have seen that there is no pejorative or distal feature whose positive value the N-effect could realize. This leads us to conclude that the N-effect is derived from the absence of a feature, consistent with the logic of markedness. Above we have proposed to locate the N-effect within the system of discourse roles: the system that distinguishes objects of discourse and subjects of discourse. We now provide some evidence for this view. First, we offer an argument for person encoding, which is based on a necessary ingredient in the pronominal competition. Being associated with person, personal pronouns denote a subset of the set that d-pronouns may denote, as illustrated in Fig. 1, repeated below for convenience.
Taking **PERSON** to indicate a discourse subject, the subset relation in Fig. 1 reflects the structure of discourse roles: d-pronouns, like definite descriptions, refer to discourse objects, that is, the entities that are referred to or talked about; personal pronouns denote discourse subjects, that is, the entities that actively participate in speech acts.15 The class of discourse subjects is contained within the class of discourse objects. The inclusion relation structured by discourse roles and **PERSON** mirrors the inclusion relation that holds between the denotations of the two categories more broadly: personal pronouns are typically restricted to denote e-type entities, whereas the d-pronoun can also denote higher types, as shown for Hebrew in 25. It includes events (25a) and propositions (25b).16

(25) a. asur la’asot zot / et ze / *oto.  
prohibited to.do Z.F.SG / ACC Z.M.SG / *him  
‘It’s prohibited to do that.’
b. miri amra zot / et ze / *oto.  
Miri said Z.F.SG / ACC Z.M.SG / *him  
‘Miri said that.’

We observe, in other words, an overlap between the two inclusion relations, one defined by discourse roles and the placement of **PERSON**, and one defined by the type-denotations of the pronouns considered for competition; in both cases the d-pronoun denotes a set that includes the denotations of personal pronouns. This cannot be accidental. In fact, it directly supports our scalar view of pronominal reference. It also supports our more specific choice to interpret **PERSON** in relation to the class of definite expressions and in terms of discourse roles: since the class of definite expressions linguistically marks entities as objects of discourse—not just as things, but as things that are referred to via language—

15 This applies to strong personal pronouns, which must denote humans, whereas weak personal pronouns may also denote nonhuman entities (Cardinaletti & Starke 1999). How exactly weak pronouns differ from strong pronouns is an intriguing and important question that can only be addressed with a better understanding of how the weak-strong typology is to be integrated with the person sphere more generally, questions that we leave open for future research.

16 The situation in German is less clear. Whereas d-pronouns are possible in these event/proposition-denoting contexts, the inanimate pronoun is also possible.

(i) weil man das / es nicht tut  
because one D.N.SG / it not does  
‘because one doesn’t do that’

(ii) Er hat das / es nicht geglaubt.  
he has D.N.SG / it not believed  
‘He didn’t believe it.’

We speculate that denotation beyond e-type entities is directly related to the absence of **PERSON**.
it seems natural to conceptualize the subclass along the same dimension, as entities that can use language (including, of course, sign language) actively, rather than in terms of broader and perhaps equivalent epistemological notions, such as sentience. This interpretation of person is also consistent, of course, with the more common interpretation of first and second person as discourse roles.

We now offer some independent evidence for our claim that the N-effect involves the negative, hence unmarked, value of a feature. In his discussion of the semantic markedness of phi-features, Sauerland (2008a) develops a variety of diagnostics for identifying the marked and unmarked values in a binary feature opposition.

The most telling diagnostic is emergence after blocking: when the more marked category is blocked, the unmarked category can replace it. For example, in formal settings, a German second-person pronoun is blocked, and a third-person plural pronoun can replace it; this is because third person is unmarked, compared to the local first and second persons. This is precisely the kind of alternation demonstrated in detail above: when a third-person pronoun is independently blocked, a d-pronoun can be used in virtually the same contexts, where a unique and salient referent has been established (i.e. the nondiscriminating use), in other words, as semantically identical to a personal pronoun (except for the N-effect). This semantic identity follows because [−person] is unmarked. It is not part of the linguistic representation of the pronoun, just like the unmarked semantics of third person may be shed when a third-person pronoun is used for formal address.

A second diagnostic is based on the characterization of a plurality of members. Sauerland 2008a argues that within a gender binary, feminine is the marked value; hence masculine is [−feminine] and feminine is [+feminine]. When a plurality of entities is mixed and includes both feminine and nonfeminine members, only [−feminine] can be used; [+feminine] is reserved for situations in which all members satisfy the characterization, when all members are feminine. The N-effect associated with plural d-pronouns seems to be weaker than the effect associated with singular d-pronouns. We can compare the N-effect that arises with a unique salient individual in the context, as in 18 repeated in 26 below, with a minimally different situation in which there are multiple individuals who are salient in the context in 27: Conchita’s band members, all of whom are on screen at the time of utterance. This too is a context in which the d-pronoun is not used to discriminate and an N-effect would be expected.

(26) [Context: A group of fans are watching the Eurovision Song Contest. Everyone’s favorite (Conchita Wurst) appears on screen.]
  a. zot od tafti’a et kulam.
      Z.f.sg yet surprise acc everyone
      ‘This one will surprise everyone yet.’
  b. Die wird jetzt alle überraschen.
      D.f.sg will now all surprise
      ‘This one will surprise everyone.’

(27) [Context: A group of fans are watching the Eurovision Song Contest. Everyone’s favorite (Conchita Wurst and her band) appears on screen.]
  a. ele od yafti’u et kulam.
      Z.pl yet surprise acc everyone
      ‘These will surprise everyone yet.’
  b. Die werden jetzt alle überraschen.
      D.pl will now all surprise
      ‘These will surprise everyone.’

The N-effect in 27 is weaker than it is in 26. This may suggest that the use of a plural d-pronoun need not entail that the speaker holds a dismissive attitude toward all mem-
bers of the plurality.\textsuperscript{17} This is expected if the N-effect is represented as absence of person (i.e. $\neg$person) in traditional feature geometries, an unmarked feature.

Taken together, the evidence from markedness seems to suggest absence of a feature (or a negative value). Since [gender] and [number] seem semantically irrelevant, and [human] or [animate] seem too strong, we conclude that absence of person underlies this meaning, with the discourse-role implications outlined above.

Having established that the N-effect is derived by the absence of person, we now turn to discuss the nature of this inference and the kind of calculation that is involved.

\textbf{5. Competition and scales.} We have seen that when a d-pronoun competes with a personal pronoun, the N-effect is triggered, and we have concluded that the N-effect is a negative inference, triggered by the absence of person. This implies that the personal pronoun is the preferred form. We now turn to discuss the source of this preference and the kinds of scales that structure pronominal competitions and preferences. Classical Gricean theory associates implicatures with particular maxims, and maxims are associated with distinct scales. Two scales are particularly relevant, associated with two distinct maxims: an informativity scale, based on asymmetric entailment and paired with a quantity maxim, and a formal scale, based on length or complexity and associated with a manner maxim. Over the years, numerous cracks in the classic Gricean picture have been identified, the most relevant one being the pairing of scales and maxims. Specifically, it has been recognized that complexity-length considerations play a role in scalar implicatures (i.e. quantity implicatures in Grice’s original classification) by restricting the set of possible alternatives (Katzir 2007, Fox & Katzir 2011, Marty 2017, Acton 2019). The significance of formal considerations for the calculation of content-based implicatures undermines the original categorical division into quantity and manner implicatures. However, our primary empirical concern here is with the scales that structure pronominal preferences, rather than the individuation of maxims or the wording of the maxims: Is there evidence for a pronominal scale based on asymmetric entailment? Is there a formal scale based on markedness or length-complexity that could be operationalized to generate the N-effect implicature? We begin by examining versions of these scales separately, and close with a brief discussion based on a more contemporary understanding of scale interaction in the derivation of scalar implicatures.

Returning to the scales to be considered, the following two seem most relevant: a scalar implicature, based on an entailment scale, and a scale based on length or markedness, in the spirit of Horn 1984, Blutner 2000, Roberts 2002, Schlenker 2005, and especially Rett 2015, 2019, where evaluative meaning is derived as a manner implicature. On an informativity-based scale, the objects to be compared are denotations arranged according to a scale of denotation inclusion, where the form that applies to the most informal denotation is preferred. This is the person sphere. On a markedness-based scale, the objects to be compared are linguistic forms, where personal pronouns are preferred over d-pronouns because they are shorter, simpler, or less marked in some other respect (see Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017 for d-pronouns and personal pronouns, and Roberts 2002, Schlenker 2005 for pronouns and definite descriptions). The choice between the two, therefore, is a choice between the kind of preferences, represented as scales, that can generate pronominal implicatures such as the N-effect.

\textsuperscript{17} The intuition that the N-effect is weaker in 27, with a plural d-pronoun, is subtle, and it is not immediately clear how to interpret it. It may imply that a dismissive attitude does not hold toward all members of the group, or it may imply that there is distancing that is not necessarily negative.
5.1. The N-effect as a scalar implicature. We have suggested that personal pronouns are specified for person and that their denotation is contained within the class of objects denoted by a d-pronoun. This suggests a scalar relationship between the denotations of the two pronominal classes. A calculation based on this scalar structure will produce a scalar implicature rooted in person.

We are suggesting, in other words, that the relationship between pronominal classes may be scalar, similar to the relationship between a and the, in a departure from the traditional view of pronouns and phi-features. According to the traditional view, pronouns and phi-features are structured around paradigmatic opposition and a complement relation, and features are usually binary. On the view that we are developing, the relation between the two pronominal classes is one of inclusion, and features do not have a binary structure; the negative value is inferred.18 The ideas embedded in the generalized person sphere have been independently motivated by a set of entirely distinct phenomena related to agreement splits (Béjar 2003, 2008, Béjar & Rezac 2009) and have a precedent in the view of phi-features as semantically interpreted and as triggering presuppositions based on considerations of markedness (McGinnis 2005, 2008, Sauerland 2008a,b).

The scalar arrangement of personal pronouns and d-pronouns is based on informativity and asymmetrical entailment, such that d-pronouns are less informative than personal pronouns. However, this may not be the only way to quantify informativity. If we consider other dimensions of content, d-pronouns may also be more informative than personal pronouns. If so, it is possible that in particular contexts of use, the relative informativity of a d-pronoun makes it a better candidate than a personal pronoun. We address this possibility in order to further substantiate our claim that a personal pronoun is the preferred choice in the contexts in which an N-effect is triggered. This qualification is important. As we show below, we agree that there are aspects of demonstrative meaning and use that are associated with d-pronouns and are not shared by personal pronouns. We have characterized these meaning components and use conditions as discriminating uses; recall the difference between 20 and 23 above, which showed that personal pronouns cannot be used to discriminate, whereas d-pronouns can. In the spirit of numerous treatments that add some semantic ingredient to demonstratives to account for these uses, we assume that demonstratives, including d-pronouns, have an extra ingredient that certain definite descriptions (weak definites, in particular) lack (Kaplan 1989, Roberts 2002, Wolter 2006, Elbourne 2008, King 2008, Nowak 2014, Ahn 2019).19 However, the N-effect arises only when the d-pronoun is not used to discriminate, and in these contexts, the d-pronoun bears no additional meaning component that would make it more informative along some dimension outside of the person sphere. When the d-pronoun is used to discriminate, the d-pronoun is, indeed, more informative in a way that justifies its choice over a personal pronoun. Hence, no N-effect arises.

The idea that demonstratives are more informative, or more marked, than personal pronouns is the more common view, expressed in some of the scales familiar from previous work (Prince 1981, Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski 1989, 1993, Ariel 1999, and more recently Ahn 2019). These scales express a hierarchy of anaphoric expressions, according to the degree to which their referents are given or mentally activated (Prince 1981, Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski 1993, Ariel 1999, among others): in this system, each cognitive status entails the lower ones to its right, and the use of an NP at a certain

---

19 We refer here to the distinction between weak and strong definites; following Löbner 1985, 2011, Wiltschko 2013, Ortmann 2014, Sichel 2021, we associate the discriminating use also with strong definites.
point on the scale implicates that the speaker could not have felicitously referred to the same entity by an NP higher on the scale (i.e. to its left).

(28)   in focus     >    activated     >    familiar    >    uniquely identifiable    >    type-identifiable
          |                       |                        |                                |                                       |
          | unstressed           | this/that              | that NP                      | the NP                                 |
          | pronouns             | NP                      | NP                           | a NP                                  |
          | this/that            | NP                      | this NP                     | indef. this NP

It is true that these degrees of mental activation are in some sense scalar, and Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) seek to derive scalar cognitive status implicatures from this hierarchy. Note that the ordering of personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns (which, we assume, are the same as d-pronouns in all relevant respects) is the reverse of our person sphere in terms of informativity: demonstratives (including demonstrative pronouns) are used to denote less salient referents than personal pronouns are, because they are more informative. The underlying intuition, that more cognitive work needs to be done to identify a less salient referent, is expressed in semantic terms by Ahn (2019), who proposes two related scales, one for pronominals and one for full lexical DPs.

(29) a. Pronominal scale: \{it, that\}
    b. Adnominal scale: \{the girl, that girl\}

In both, the demonstrative expression contains an additional restriction R and is more informative, or marked, than its alternative is. The economy principle associated with these scales, ‘Don’t overdetermine!’’, requires speakers to say as little as they can without compromising intelligibility, corresponding to Grice’s second maxim of quantity: ‘Don’t say too much!’. While Ahn’s scale would arrive at the same general preference for a personal pronoun, it does so via a different route: by assigning more informativity to the demonstrative and requiring speakers to be least informative, rather than most informative as in our approach and in more traditional scalar implicatures. As explained above, we do not deny that d-pronouns could be ranked as more informative than personal pronouns along some dimension of informativity. Importantly, such a ranking cannot be at the core of the N-effect, which arises when the d-pronoun is not used to discriminate. This is precisely what the N-effect reveals: that alongside the added informativity of demonstratives and d-pronouns, when used to discriminate, there is also a basic, noncontextual, sense in which personal pronouns are more informative. On our account, d-pronouns, as a class—discriminating or not—denote discourse objects, a class that may also include the class of discourse subjects, as we can always communicate about the people we communicate with.

5.2. The N-effect as a manner implicature. We have seen that it is possible to derive the N-effect as a scalar implicature, where the preference for a personal pronoun over a d-pronoun is based on entailment and informativity. Could it also be derived from a competition between pronominal forms? In principle, it could be, as long as the formal competition can generate an inference. We examine the possibility that pronominal competition is derived via a manner implicature within a Neo-Gricean framework (Horn 1984, Blutner 2000, Jäger 2002, Rett 2015, 2019) and, in particular, a preference for brief, less marked forms: a personal pronoun is preferred over a d-pronoun because it is less costly—it is simpler, shorter, or less marked. At first glance this might seem like an obvious direction, since in some cases, the personal pronoun is a proper subpart of the d-pronoun (Wiltschko 1998, Sichel 2001). For example, the Hebrew distal d-pronoun is transparently composed of the definite article and the personal pronoun form (i.e. ha-hi = ‘the-she’), as is the German d-pronoun that consists of the definite marker d- and the personal pronoun form (der = d+er). However, this does not hold across the board; the Hebrew proximate form cannot be decomposed and is no more complex on the sur-
face than a personal pronoun. Similarly, the German feminine personal pronoun has an added -s- not present in the d-pronoun (\textit{d-ie} vs. \textit{s-ie}). We need to look beyond morphology for a measure of markedness or length-complexity that would rank personal pronouns as less marked, less long, or less complex than d-pronouns. We do not outright exclude this possibility, and we return to this when we consider the contribution of formal complexity to the selection of alternatives, but we see some significant challenges for a highly underspecified theory of markedness along the lines of Horn 1984 and Rett 2015, 2019.

A calculation based on form (a subpart of Grice’s original manner maxim) compares forms and proceeds from the assumption that the competing forms are identical in meaning. We have shown that the denotation of the d-pronoun includes the denotation of the personal pronoun, but for the purpose of considering a form-based inference we set inclusion aside and fix identity of denotation to the nondiscriminating contexts in which both pronominals are used and the N-effect is triggered. In a scale based on form, some forms are more optimally suited than others to express a given interpretation; the implicature arises due to the choice of a less-preferred form.

For concreteness, consider the \textsc{pragmatic division of labor} (Horn 1984), which maps the Gricean maxims to a speaker-based maxim, the R-\textsc{principle}, which dictates an economy of form, and a hearer-based maxim, the Q-\textsc{principle}, which requires a sufficient amount of information. These principles are defined in terms of markedness, a notion that applies both to forms and to interpretations. The combination of formal and interpretive ingredients is crucial, since the competition between pronominal forms produces an inference.

(30) a. Q-\textsc{principle}: ‘Say enough for the hearer to understand you!’ = Do not use an unmarked form for a marked meaning.
   b. R-\textsc{principle}: ‘Be brief; do not say too much!’ = Do not use a marked form for an unmarked meaning.

These principles instruct interlocuters to use marked forms for marked meanings and unmarked forms for unmarked meanings. An example from the domain of pronouns is the \textsc{avoid pronoun principle} (Chomsky 1981, Horn 1984), where a pronoun is interpreted as disjoint from an antecedent when it alternates with PRO.

(31) a. John$_1$ would much prefer [his$_2$\textasteriskcentered$_1$ going to the movie].
   b. John$_1$ would much prefer [PRO$_1$ going to the movie].
   c. John$_1$ would much prefer [his$_1$\textasteriskcentered$_2$ own book].

Horn considers the overt pronoun to be the marked form, and the control reading to be the unmarked interpretation; the unmarked form PRO is used for the control reading, and the marked, overt, form for marked interpretations, which presumably are all of the other readings that personal pronouns can have. Extending this reasoning to the personal pronoun/d-pronoun alternation, forms would be mapped to meanings as outlined in 32.

(32) a. personal pronoun: unmarked form, unmarked situations
   b. d-pronoun: marked form, marked situations
   c. The hearer reasons that the speaker had reasons to avoid the personal pronoun, and to use the d-pronoun instead.

We see a few issues with this type of implementation.\footnote{The reservations that we raise in the main text apply to later versions within \textsc{bidirectional optimality theory} (OT) as well (Zeevat 1999, Blutner 2000, Jäger 2002). Within bidirectional OT, an expression is blocked for a particular interpretation if that interpretation could be generated more economically by an alternative expression. For the reasons given in the text, we think that this notion of economy, though intuitive, is too vague to rank these pronouns.} First, how would the hearer or speaker know which of the forms is the more marked? Markedness of forms can be un-
derstood in a variety of ways. Levinson 2000, for example, allows multiple sources for form-markedness: marked forms are more morphologically complex, less lexicalized, more periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register; Katzir 2007 considers structural complexity. Unlike the choice between a pronoun and definite description, previously analyzed as a manner-based preference for simpler or shorter forms (Roberts 2002, Schlenker 2005), these parameters do not clearly distinguish the two pronouns. Some, but not all, d-pronouns have a personal pronoun as a subpart; others have the same length as personal pronouns. The two pronominal classes are equally nonperiphrastic, they are used with the same frequency, and there are no consistent dialect or register differences across the two languages. Therefore, whatever would make the personal pronoun less marked or the better choice would have to be based on a property that is more abstract than sheer length or the inclusion of descriptive content in the restrictor: for example, syntactic structure (Wiltschko 1998 and Patel-Grosz & Grosz 2017), to which we return below.

Turning to interpretive markedness, the N-effect is obviously more marked than the absence of an N-effect, but this cannot be the basis for d-pronoun markedness, since this is the meaning we want to derive as a result of violating a preestablished preference. If it were not derived, the hearer would have to rationalize that the speaker’s reason for avoiding the personal pronoun is their dismissive attitude, but the N-effect could not possibly be constructed from scratch.

Similar considerations apply to the analysis of evaluativity as a markedness-related implicature in adjectival antonyms like tall–short (Rett 2015, 2019). Rett postulates that what makes short more marked is its atypicality, and it is atypical because it is evaluative. While characterizing a human being as not being a potential discourse subject certainly qualifies as an atypical characterization, it is not clear why, given an infinite number of ways in which individuals could count as atypical, it is this particular characterization that emerges. It is therefore difficult to derive the content of the N-effect from this general notion of markedness of interpretation. On our approach, the content of the N-effect is directly derived from the nonchoice of a personal pronoun.

Finally, we consider a syntactic measure of complexity, in terms of the amount of containing structure associated with pronominal forms. Wiltschko 1998 and Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002 argue that d-pronouns are DPs, associated with more containing structure than personal pronouns, which are $\phi$Ps.

\begin{align}
(33) \quad \text{a. d-pronouns} & \quad \text{b. $\phi$-pronouns} \\
&D \quad \phiP \\
&\phi \quad NP \\
\end{align}

Grosz and Patel-Grosz (2017) develop an analysis of the preference for personal pronouns over d-pronouns in these terms, combined with minimize structure (Cardi-
naletti & Starke 1999). This is useful for constructing the class of alternatives, to which we return, but it cannot be the exclusive basis for deriving the N-effect. The most obvious challenge is that a contentful inference cannot be based exclusively on structure. Additionally, a syntactic division cannot capture the distribution of the N-effect. The syntax of φP vs. DP leads to the expectation that an N-effect should be associated with any use of a d-pronoun, discriminating or not. One could stipulate that the phrase structure actually draws a three-way distinction: Detdiscrim → Detnondiscrim → φP, for discriminating d-pronouns, nondiscriminating d-pronouns, and personal pronouns, respectively. We see no particular motivation for this division. Moreover, it is of no help, since it does not express the equivalence of nondiscriminating d-pronouns and personal pronouns, easily and naturally represented in our person sphere, where the referential space covered by the outer sphere includes the space covered in the inner sphere.

Yet we do not think that syntactic structure is necessarily irrelevant. Katzir (2007) has argued that the alternatives for scalar implicatures are determined by structural complexity, such that alternatives cannot be more complex than the item they are competing with. The tree structures in 33 would imply that a personal pronoun qualifies as an alternative to a d-pronoun, whereas a d-pronoun would not qualify as an alternative to a personal pronoun, UNLESS it was used to discriminate—the correct result.

5.3. The N-effect as an implicated presupposition. We have established over the last few sections that the inference which arises from the choice of a d-pronoun is a negated grammatical feature, PERSON, and that this grammatical feature bears content, namely subject of discourse. Before concluding, we address some properties that appear at first glance to conflict with our claim that the N-effect is an implicature. In particular, presuppositions project out of the class of contexts called holes, which includes negation, questions, modals, and conditionals, and the projection pattern for the N-effect is similar. Implicatures, in contrast, are reversed in the scope of negation.

When a hole combines with an at-issue proposition p, the result of that combination does not entail p, as in 34. As is well known, presuppositions in these environments are not canceled. The sentences in 35 continue to presuppose that Kevin has a house.

(34) a. Kevin lives in LA.
   b. Kevin doesn’t live in LA.
   c. Does Kevin live in LA?
   d. Kevin might live in LA.
   e. If Kevin lives in LA, I will visit him there.

(35) a. I stayed at Kevin’s house in LA.
   b. I didn’t stay at Kevin’s house in LA.
   c. Did you stay at Kevin’s house?

The N-effect displays a similar pattern. When a sentence containing a d-pronoun is negated, the negation does not apply to the N-effect. It projects, on a par with presupposed content.

(36) zot lo tenaceax.
    Z.f.sg neg win
    ‘This one won’t win.’

   Cannot mean: ‘She will not win and it’s not the case that I don’t respect her.’

   Similarly, in questions, the N-effect does not fall within the scope of the question operator. In other words, it is not included in the content that is questioned in 37. The first response by the interlocutor is odd because it is denying an N-effect while assenting to the containing proposition, suggesting that the QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION is a ques-
tion about the N-effect. In the second response, the interlocutor assents to or denies the proposition, and separately denies the N-effect via the use of ‘but’, and this is felicitous.

(37) A: icbena ox xot?
    annoyed you Z.f.sg
    ‘Did that one annoy you?’
B: #lo, hi xavara Seli, aval hi mamaS icbena oti.
    ‘No, she’s my friend, but she really annoyed me.’
B: ken/lo, aval hi xavera Seli ve-ani ma’ari S ota.
    ‘Yes/no, but she’s my friend and I actually respect her.’

Presuppositions differ in this respect from ordinary implicatures. Scalar implicatures are reversed in the scope of negation (Atlas & Levinson 1981, Sauerland 2004): a positive sentence with some implicates the negation of the sentence with all, and similarly, the negative sentence with all implicates its negation when some is replaced by all. Since the two negations cancel each other, in 38b this derives the implicature that the Philharmonic played some of Beethoven’s symphonies.

(38) a. The Philharmonic played some of Beethoven’s symphonies.  
    → they didn’t play all 
    b. The Philharmonic didn’t play all of Beethoven’s symphonies. 
    → they didn’t not play some → they played some 

That the N-effect patterns with presuppositions, and not with ordinary implicatures, is surprising at first glance, if the N-effect is a type of scalar implicature. We can resolve this tension without compromising our claim that the N-effect is an implicature if person is presuppositional (Sauerland 2008a, and more recently Charnavel 2019; cf. Sudo (2012), who argues that person is asserted, not presupposed), and scalar implicatures may also be derived on the basis of presupposed material (Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008b). We assume, with Magri 2009 and Marty 2017, that the calculation of such anti-presuppositions is no different from the calculation of implicatures based on assertive content.  

If phi-features, when interpreted, are interpreted as a presupposition on the reference of an expression that denotes an individual, it follows that phi-feature markedness must involve a mechanism for calculating competition among presuppositions. Sauerland (2008b) argues that maximize presupposition (given in 39; Hawkins 1991, Heim 1991, Percus 2006) extends to phi-features.

(39) Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible!

‘Maximize presupposition’ is a version of the quantity maxim, extended to the domain of presuppositions. This is fully compatible with the inclusion relation proposed above. Continuing to hold that personal pronouns are specified for person, and that person is associated with the interpretation suggested above (subject of discourse), the use of a d-pronoun when a personal pronoun is available implies that the speaker does not consider the referent to be associated with person. The only change is that person is a presupposition, and the inference that the referent lacks person is now an implicated presupposition, rather than an ordinary implicature. While both personal pronouns and d-pronouns can denote subjects of discourse, only the personal pronoun presupposes this property, so ‘maximize presupposition’ dictates that it be used whenever possible.

22 We leave open more specific questions of implementation, as well as other aspects of the similarity of anti-presuppositions to ordinary implicatures (see, in particular, Singh 2011, Gajewski & Sharvit 2012).
6. CONCLUSIONS. When compared with reflexives, se pronouns, PRO, or a wh-trace, a personal pronoun is the less preferred form (Montalbetti 1984, Hellan 1988, Burzio 1991, Williams 1997, Bresnan 2001, Safir 2004, Sichel 2014, among others). Here we have identified a pronominal competition in which the personal pronoun is preferred over a d-pronoun. This suggests that personal pronouns are not dedicated to being used as a default, when other means fail. Whether a pronoun is preferred or dispreferred depends on its alternatives, and it implies a scale of preference, perhaps multiple scales, which structure pronominal alternatives along particular dimensions. We have argued for a scale that is based on denotations, similar to the scale that structures the calculation of scalar implicatures among determiners. A central ingredient in our scalar analysis of pronominal denotations is an expressive-meaning component, the N-effect, which arises whenever a personal pronoun could also be used. We argued that this meaning ingredient is not due to a positive specification of pejorative or distal, but to the absence of person, which, according to the logic of markedness, excludes an interpretation as discourse subject.

The novel ingredient is the scalar arrangement of pronominal denotations in which the denotations of personal pronouns are included within the denotations of d-pronouns. This relation has been obscured until now, since the comparison of demonstratives (including d-pronouns) to personal pronouns has considered demonstratives as a class, including discriminating uses. In these contexts a demonstrative is indeed more informative than a personal pronoun. The distribution of the N-effect highlights the difference between discriminating and nondiscriminating uses of d-pronouns, and as a consequence, it reveals the reverse relationship between personal pronouns and d-pronouns, and definite descriptions more generally: the denotation of the former is included in the latter. This places the relation between definite descriptions and pronouns on a continuum with the inclusion relation among different values for person: speaker, local, person. Perhaps this is not accidental. If we are correct, the person sphere bears various consequences for the integration of personal pronouns into the landscape of nominal expressions in general, too broad to consider in any detail here. One potential consequence is that a personal pronoun is not simply identical to a definite description, minus the descriptive content.

There is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the status of scalar implicatures, and whether they are part of the pragmatics, related to speaker’s intentions, part of the grammar and calculated locally, or within the lexicon, associated with particular lexical items. This debate has multiple empirical foci, and here we have only been able to hint at some aspects of the N-effect that might be relevant to a few strands of the debate. Our study shows that scalar implicatures must be able to apply to linguistic information that is maximally fine-grained, such as phi-features, and that the scales upon which they are based, along with the scales that restrict alternatives, may be abstract to a significant degree. Whether this is an argument for the lexical or grammatical status of scalar implicatures, and how our observations might be developed into a full-fledged argument in this context, we must leave open. We hope that future work will continue to integrate our empirical observations into more general discussion about the landscape of nominal expressions and the nature of conversational implicatures.

REFERENCES


[isichel@ucsc.edu] [Received 21 April 2019; revision invited 13 August 2019; revision received 29 December 2019; revision invited 5 April 2020; revision received 14 July 2020; accepted pending revisions 27 July 2020; revision received 18 August 2020; accepted 19 August 2020]

[martina.wiltschko@icrea.cat]